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Mobilizing Movements, Mobilizing Islamic Resistance 
 
Rachael M. Rudolph 
 
 
Recent world events, ranging from international violence to elections, have propelled 
academics and policymakers to examine Islamic resistance movements more closely.  Previous 
studies of such movements, in both the English and Arabic literature, has been limited to 
historical case studies.  The lack of systematic cross-case comparisons has limited the 
development of generalizable propositions regarding movement mobilization. In a first effort to 
remedy this gap in the literature, this study examines the mobilization of Islamic resistance 
movements—the FIS, the PIJ, Hamas, the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG—in three different 
countries located in three different regions. Mobilization was examined utilizing the American 
and European paradigms within the social movement literature.  The American paradigm 
emphasized the role of activists for mobilization, whereas the European paradigm emphasized 
identity.  The central goal of the study is to answer the following: Do Islamic resistance 
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Islamic resistance movements engaged in both violent and non-violent protest have 
existed from the 7th Century to the present.  While their emergence is nothing new, recent world 
events ranging from international violence to elections have propelled academics and 
policymakers to examine them more closely.  The majority of the literature on these movements 
examine them within a given country on a case-by-case basis, providing a detailed historical 
analysis (Bodansky, 2007; Levitt, 2006; Harik, 2004; Mishal and Sela 2000).  Similarly, the 
Arabic literature has also emphasized case-by-case historical analysis of resistance movements 
(Al-Hamad and Al-Barghuthi, 1997; Al-Barghuthi, 1990; Bin Yusuf, 1989).  Even the Arabic 
literature that provides strategies or methods for developing an Islamic resistance movement is 
geographically limited and does not provide general propositions regarding mobilization across 
cases (Azzam, 1987; Mawdudi, 1973; Qutb, 1967).  A lack of systematic cross-case comparisons 
of Islamic resistance movements within and across the geographical locations selected prohibits 
the development of generalizable propositions regarding movement mobilizations. 
Do Islamic resistance movements share common mobilization characteristics?  
Movement mobilization has been widely studied in the American and European literature, with 
studies focusing on those mobilizing in the United States, Europe, South Africa or Latin 
America.  They have rarely been studied in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia.  
Movements are defined as a form of association, as collective challenges by people with 
common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Tarrow, 
1994).  These forms of association are concerned with the appropriation and orientation of social 
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values and resources which transgress institutionalized norms (Vahabzadeh, 2001; Melucci, 
1980).  Thus, they are action-based systems operating in a systemic field of opportunities 
(Vahabzadeh, 2001; Melucci, 1985).  Movements use differing means, ends and forms of 
solidarity and organization that converge in a more or less stable manner, which produce unity 
(Carroll and Hackett, 2006; Melucci, 1989).  The formation or mobilization of movements, 
according to movement scholars, is a form of protest, a declaration of disagreement, dissent, 
objection and unwillingness to comply (Yiftachel, 1997; Lofland, 1985).  It is the most common 
form for fomenting change, which ranges from rhetoric to violence (Yiftachel, 1997; Herman, 
1995).  This study is concerned with the mobilization of Islamic resistance movements engaged 
in both non-violent and violent forms of protest. 
Existing movement mobilization literature fails to examine the emergence of Islamic 
resistance movements from within social movement theory (Simsek, 2004).  Simsek, however, 
does examine Islamic socio-cultural and political organizations in Turkey, but not Islamic 
resistance movements.  In his study, Simsek posited that Marxism or post-Marxism was 
irrelevant to Islamism, which is both an old and new movement based on theoretical criteria.  
Islamism in Turkey was a post-modernist movement that perceived the modernization process 
and its associational phenomenon, such as secularism, as highly repressive of its system of 
values and other major projects such as the Islamic way of life and its own understanding of 
civilization (Semsek, 2004:  120-124). 
Islamism in Turkey, Simsek argues, is also very much a post-traditionalist movement 
because it critiques and reinterprets traditional faith, which is a major part of Islamic revivalism.  
It both transforms the “passive” tradition by emphasizing and making visible several aspects in 
the public sphere in order to enhance and restructure the latter, and tries to formulate its own 
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modernity through hybridization between the revived tradition and modernity.  It is primarily 
middle-class based, but receives support from lower socio-economic classes and the politically 
disenfranchised.  It is also a post-material and identity-oriented movement, raising symbolic 
issues and demanding religious and cultural recognition in the public sphere, which attempts to 
create an Islamic identity and way of life. Specifically, in Turkey, it began as a reactive 
movement but gradually became a proactive social movement by raising diverse issues, pursuing 
goals concerning the present and every day life.  The movement is highly centralized at the 
political level, but decentralized at the civil society level (Semsek 2004:  120-124). 
Simsek’s analysis is limited because it is restricted to within country comparisons.  This 
type of comparative analysis does not permit the deduction of evidence for the generalizable 
claims posited by both the American and European paradigms.  This study, therefore, builds on 
Simsek’s work by examining Islamist movements in Algeria, Palestine and the Philippines. It 
differs because it examines movements that have arisen in different geographical locations, at 
different times, and that employ differing forms of protest.   Emphasis on movement 
mobilization, with spatial and temporal differentiation and forms of protest, permits the 
formulation of more generalizable propositions regarding mobilization of contemporary Islamic 
resistance that would not otherwise be observable by a single case-by-case study. 
Moreover, with the exception of Simsek, social movement scholars do not examine the 
emergence of Islamic movements from within social movement theory.  Likewise, Islamic 
resistance scholars fail to examine the emergence of Islamic resistance movements from within 
social movement theory (Bodansky, 2007; Levitt, 2006; Harik, 2004; Mishal and Sela, 2000).  
This study, therefore, seeks to bridge that gap.  It seeks to examine the emergence of Islamic 
resistance movements from within social movement theory.  In particular, it seeks to examine 
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Islamic resistance movements in Algeria, Palestine and the Philippines that use differing means, 
ends and forms of solidarity.  Not only have Islamic movements been neglected by social 
movement scholars, but so too have the regions in which this study is concerned.  Moreover, by 
examining six movements within three different countries, it will add to the existing literature on 
Islamic movements, which is confined to case-by-case and country specific studies.  Moving 
beyond the case-by-case, country specific studies will aid in the construction of shared 
mobilization characteristics; and, it will aid in the development of generalizable propositions 
regarding these movement mobilizations. 
Given that this study is rooted in social movement theory, the remainder of this chapter 
will examine the existing theoretical traditions from the pre to post-1970 periods.  The pre-1970 
period provided the foundation for two theoretical paradigms that have come to dominate 
contemporary social movement literature.  The post-1970 period is bifurcated into two camps—
1) the American and 2) the European (Edelman, 2001; Joppke, 1991; Rochon, 1990).  The 
American paradigm is strategy oriented, which posits that mobilization is the product of 
movement activists strategically using political context and grievances.  The European paradigm 
posits that mobilization is a product of the social environment creating shared identities among 
movement activists.  Polarization of scholarship into these two camps has resulted in calls for an 
integrated approach (Edelman, 2001; Vasi, 2006; Semsek, 2004).  This study reiterates the call 
for an integrated approach, utilizing elements of the American and European paradigms to 
explain mobilization of contemporary Islamic resistance in three countries. 
Theories of Collective Action 
Theories of collective action have undergone a number of paradigmatic shifts over the 
years (Edelman, 2001).  From the 1920s to the early 1970s, social organization was juxtaposed 
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with collective behavior, wherein movements were seen as symptoms of societal deprivations, 
mass responses to economic crises, and charismatic leaders with mob mentality (Edelman, 2001; 
Park, 1967; Arendt, 1951).  The collective behavior perspective, associated first with the works 
of LeBon (1930) and early Gurr (1970), emphasized movements’ organization, tactical 
sophistication, reliance on privileged portions of the population, and use of mainstream channels 
of communication and fund-raising (Rochon 1990). According to the collective behavior 
perspective, movements were a reaction to deprivation. 
Studies using this theoretical framework indicated that conditions of economic and/or 
political deprivation led to the emergence of movements (Champagne, 1983).  Social deprivation 
was defined as widespread dissatisfaction with socio-cultural institutions, which were perceived 
as inadequate to provide ordinary satisfaction (Champagne, 1983; Barbar, 1941).  Other studies 
also emphasized conditions of absolute and social deprivation (Thorton, 1981; Carroll, 1975; 
Barbar, 1941).  The problem with many of these studies is that deprivation was viewed as the 
sole cause for mobilization and collective action; structural differentiation was not taken into 
consideration or factored into analyses of causality. 
Champagne (1983) demonstrated that the emergence of movements was a product of both 
widespread perception of deprivation and structural differentiation.  Structural differentiation is a 
process whereby a structure or institution differentiates into two or more structures or institutions 
that are structurally distinct from each other, but taken together function as a whole 
(Rueschemeyer, 1977; Smelser, 1959).  Studies coupling both posited that more structurally 
differentiated societies had greater capacities for institutionalizing change than less structurally 
differentiated societies (Champagne, 1983; Eisenstaedt, 1978, Parsons, 1971 and 1966).  That is, 
in societies where greater structural opportunities for movement participation existed, there was 
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less likelihood for such groups to work outside of existing institutionalized boundaries.  In 
contrast, less structurally differentiated societies did not allow for institutionalized expansion, 
which permitted inclusion of movement participation.  Less structural differentiation, moreover, 
exacerbated perceptions of and actual deprivation. This, juxtaposed with the inability of societies 
to institutionalize change, aided in creating societal conditions necessary for mobilization 
(Champagne, 1983). For example, in societies wherein contemporary Islamic resistance 
movements emerged there was a perception among inhabitants of deprivation and limited 
structural differentiation.  However, as will be demonstrated in this study, they are not the only 
variables contributing to movement mobilization. 
Theoretically, Olson (1965), according to Edelman (2001), marked a point of departure in 
the collective behavior perspective.  Rejecting irrationality, Olson posited that collective action 
was explained by the sum of strategic decisions of individuals not enticed by incentives or 
sanctions. The problem, according to Edelman, was that individuals, knowledgeable of severe 
risks, continued to participate in mass movements.  For contemporary Islamic resistance 
movements, individuals were also aware of the risks associated with participation, but chose to 
do so regardless of the consequence.  Moreover, the risks assumed were both collective and 
individual in nature and varied according to degree.  For example, in contemporary Islamic 
resistance movements, a member of the information bureau assumes less of a personal risk than a 
member in the military bureau.  However, they both share collective liability for movement 
action. 
The collective behavior perspective was also challenged by Marxist-oriented 
explanations.  Marxism, in contrast, defined movements and collective action as revolving 
around the fundamental contradiction between class interests and historical agency derived from 
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class position (Edelman, 2001; Thompson, 1971).  The problem, according to Edelman, was that 
movements were largely comprised of individuals from the middle-class and had multi-class 
constituencies.  For contemporary Islamic resistance movements, this was also true.  Although 
Islamic in nature, movements had populist agendas and constituencies from all socio-economic 
classes and multi-class constituencies.  Moreover, they continue to be populist in nature and 
comprised of multiple socio-economic classes, with multi-class constituencies. 
The collective behavior approach and Marxist critiques thereof provided a foundation for 
the theoretical paradigms that emerged in the 1970s. While there was a lack of theoretical 
generalization, two distinct paradigms emerged—1) the American and 2) the European 
(Edelman, 2001; Cohen, 1985; Della-Porta and Diani, 1999; Foweraker, 1995; Garner, 1997; 
Larana et al., 1994; McAdam, 1996).  These paradigms, although not schools, were 
differentiated enough to constitute two distinct theoretical trends (Edelman, 2001).   The 
American paradigm consisted of resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structures, 
and political process theory, with the latter dominating the field after the 1990s.  The European 
paradigm, concerned primarily with identity politics, consisted of new social movement theory, 
which was referred to as popular movement theory in its application outside of America and 
Europe.  Both the American and European paradigms are examined in the following subsections. 
 
The American Paradigm 
 
 Rooted in the collective behavior perspective, but challenged by the European paradigm, 
the American paradigm consisted of varying theoretical frameworks.  The American paradigm, 
with all its varying theoretical frameworks, is strategy oriented and analyzes material, human, 
cognitive, technological, and organizational resources that movements employ to expand, reward 
participants, and gain a stake in the political and social system (Edelman, 2001; Cohen, 1985).  
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The American paradigm departed from the European paradigm over the why and how of 
movements.  It criticized the European paradigm for being unable to explain how movements 
arose in particular times and places.  This led American theorists to deviate from their own 
theoretical tradition and to emphasize resource mobilization theory (Edelman, 2001; McAdam et 
al., 1996; Zald, 1992; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). 
Resource mobilization theory, concerned with resource availability and preference 
structures rather than the structural bases of social conflict, regards collective action as interest 
group politics by socially connected groups rather than by those most disenfranchised (Edelman, 
2001).  The problem with the collective behavior perspective, according to these theorists, was 
that movements were often times spontaneous uprisings against desperate circumstances 
(Rochon, 1990).  Resource mobilization deemphasized deprivation and political grievances and 
emphasized the combination of political opportunities with the mobilization of individual and 
institutional resources.  This combination sparked movement emergence.  Movements, therefore, 
were seen as deliberate strategies of mobilization, backed by organizational and political 
resources (Rochon, 1990). 
An outgrowth of the resource mobilization approach was an emphasis on issues capable 
of mobilizing people to action (Klandermans, 1989).   These studies argued that shifts in public 
issue-attention led to the rise and decline of movements (Joppke, 1991). Examining the anti-
nuclear movements in West Germany and the United States, Joppke demonstrated that shifts in 
public attention contributed to both the rise and decline of movements due to their feeding on 
cultural motifs and competition among one another for scarce resources.  The rise of movements 
was therefore dependent on the societies’ attention to social and political issues.  The elevation 
of both issues resulted in movements similarly concerned becoming salient.  As a result, 
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competition emerged.  Movements competed for status and power, which were exacerbated 
when they lacked a well-defined constituency and, thus, depended more on public attention to 
the issues addressed. 
The decline of movements occurred when issues were no longer externally addressed, 
which resulted in the loss of prominence in politics and culture; and, when movements’ goals 
were realized and, when the general motif, which fields an issue, shifted to a related yet distinct 
issue (Joppke, 1991).  The latter factor, according to Joppke, led to the rise of parallel 
movements.  The question that arises is whether a movement actually declines or shifts to 
correspond with public attention.  While shifts in attention do affect the rise and decline of 
movements, the argument failed to consider that if there were no ideological conflicts with the 
attendant goals, then there would be evolution rather than the decline and creation of a new 
movement.1 
Another outgrowth of resource mobilization was an emphasis on a reliance of linkages 
between individuals, organizations and institutions in the establishment of movements (Rochon, 
1990).  The emphasis on the role of linkages for movement mobilization has demonstrated that 
contact between individuals, organizations, institutions, and movements must be abundant when 
the more marginal the clientele.  Linkages were necessary for movements to be sustained, as 
their   decline was a product of not sustaining contacts or linkages.  Linkages, moreover, blurred 
the line between movements and established political channels such as political parties and 
interest groups.2 
                                                            
1 See Rudolph and Van Engeland (2008) regarding the role of ideological conflicts resulting in the decline or demise 
of movements and ideological evolution in the absence of such conflicts.     
2 See Rudolph and Van Engeland (2008) for the importance of linkages to movements in a globalized world of both 




Due to the lack of emphasis on the relationship between the state and movements by 
resource mobilization theorists, a new theoretical approach emerged—that is, Political 
Opportunity Structures (Rochon, 1990).   This theory contended that mobilization was a function 
of the changes in the level of elite receptivity to protest, changes in elite ability and willingness 
to repress movements, and the presence of elite allies. Thus, political climate, independent of 
movement mobilization, strongly affected the potential outcomes of movements.  Therefore, 
political context mattered most for mobilization (Edelman, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Rochon, 1990). 
Scholars within the political opportunity structure framework were concerned with the 
internal dynamics of movements, movement strategizing in the context of the balance of 
opportunity threats for challengers, and facilitation or repression by authorities (Edelman, 2001; 
Tarrow, 1998).  The relationship between the state and movement were heavily emphasized.  
Interaction between the movement and state, according to Rochon (1990), could be both direct 
and indirect and strategies of interactions were both confrontational and collaborative.  The 
balance between the two often depended on political context.  The more centralized the state, the 
more conflictual the relationship.   While Rochon argued it was interactions and not group 
rhetoric that needed to be studied, there is need for both, as group rhetoric serves as a signal to 
those it is directed.  Political opportunity structure theory gives little attention to the discursive 
aspects of movements; it failed to recognize the social construction of political opportunity 
structure itself and ignored its local and international aspects (Edelman, 2001; Abdulhadi, 1998). 
Related herein and to the aforementioned were studies viewing the viability and efficacy 
of movements as outcomes of interactions between internal and external factors (Hermann, 1992; 
Zald and Ash, 1996).  Internal factors included institutionalization processes, changes in 
leadership, and ideological flexibility. External factors included changing social conditions that 
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either strengthen or weaken the political support of movements, signals sent by society as a 
whole on the attainability of a movement’s goals, and the presence or absence of other 
movements.    A study conducted by Hermann (1992) on contemporary peace movements found 
that success and failure of movements were  the outcome of their conscientious efforts to 
respond effectively to both internal and external demands, to have political impact, and at the 
same time to sustain their original raison d’être.  It also demonstrated that aspirations to gain 
political significance and mass legitimation, through ideological modifications, also had 
undesirable results such as perceptual ambiguity, internal divisions, and loss of external 
credibility.  The consequence was that movements fell short of realizing their potential 
(Hermann, 1992). 
Yet, if the organizational structure underlying a movement contains mechanisms to 
prevent public displays of perceptual ambiguity, internal divisions and loss of external 
credibility, then it would not fall short of realizing its potential.  Not actually ideological 
modification occurs but rather ideological evolution.  Ideological shifts are necessary and 
successful when movements have internal mechanisms within their organizational structure to 
prevent fragmentation (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  Moreover, both ideological shifts 
and organizational mechanisms to prevent fragmentation permit evolution.  Thus, movements are 
able to both maintain and gain greater political significance and mass legitimation. 
By the late 1990s, proponents of political opportunity structures came to see the theory’s 
contributions as one element in a broader political process, which included greater emphasis on 
the cultural-historical sources of discontent, protest, and mobilization (Edelman, 2001).  This 
shift in theory gave way to political process theory, which has continued to dominate the 
American paradigm since the end of the 1990s (Edelman, 2001; Giugni, 1999).  Like political 
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opportunity structures, political process theory was concerned with the political environment in 
which movements emerged, in particular the external environment (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; 
Meyer, 1999).  Adopting the political opportunity thesis, political process theory posited that 
movements emerged because of expanding political opportunities; and, once they had emerged, 
movements would continue to expand such opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Tilly, 
1994).  The political process thesis added organizational and cultural factors to political 
opportunity.  It posited that movements emerged when expanding political opportunities were 
seized by individuals, who were both aggrieved and optimistic about redressing their grievances 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). 
Studies herein emphasized how external opportunity structures, governing crises, and 
state structures supported or obstructed the process of collective action (Goodwin and Jasper, 
1999; Edelman, 2001).   This emphasis on the external was largely due to the argument that the 
world outside of movements led to movement mobilization.  Some scholars, however, have 
recognized that opportunities do not cause mobilization.  Rather, opportunities are a part of a 
multitude of factors that create the necessary conditions.  Having the needed conditions also 
depended on individuals making strategic choices, intentionally taking advantage of that which 
they had at hand. Movements were required to make choices regarding language, claims, and 
opponents; they were also constrained by what they could say and do, the experiences of 
participants and those who they were attempting to mobilize (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1992). 
Movements did not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum (Meyer, 1999).  
Rather, goals, strategies and tactics were chosen because they became more attractive and 
efficacious in a political context that shaped grievances.  The result is that some claims are 
advantaged over others, subject to constraints associated with the structure of the governance 
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system and the location of key actors such as political allies (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1992).  
Political context, whether there is greater or less openness/access, provided specific opportunities 
(Meyer, 1999; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 1973).  Choice, then, is understood through examination of 
resources available to movements, the venue in which they were employed, and the belief of 
participants that the goals, strategies and tactics were necessary and effective (Meyer, 1999). 
Goals, strategies and tactics were further conditioned by cultural factors, as actions are 
suspended in symbolic webs of meaning (Goodwin, 1994).  Symbols are signs that have meaning 
and significance through their interpretations, which produces patterns of relations or culture.  
Culture, thus, is patterned and patterning; it is enabling as well as constraining; and, it is 
observable in linguistic practices (Polletta, 1999).  As was previously mentioned, political 
process theory incorporated cultural factors with explanations of movement mobilization, which 
resource mobilization and political opportunity structures failed to incorporate (Polletta, 1999; 
Johnston and Klandermans, 1995).  The addition of cultural factors to the American paradigm is 
largely due to the critique by new social movement theorists of resource mobilization and 
political opportunity structures. 
For theorists herein, structure was cultural. That is, according to Polletta (1999), culture 
was not the cause of but, rather, mediated between objective political opportunities and objective 
mobilization (McCarthy, McAdam and Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1997).  
Moreover, culture constrained action as far as it impeded the capacity to perceive the system’s 
objective vulnerability (Polletta, 1999).  Differing political opportunity structures reflect 
differing public conceptions of the scope and role of the state (Polletta, 1999; Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996). Conceptions or perceptions influence opportunities for different forms of protest 
(Polletta, 1999; Della Porta, 1996). Traditions, principles, codes and arrangements are structural 
 
  14
in the sense that they are symbolic; they are ways of ordering reality, which operate in the sphere 
of institutional politics (Polletta, 1999). 
Culture, therefore, recognizes the social dimensions of political structures and processes 
and not only affects structure, but also opportunity.  It plays an important role in creating 
opportunity.  As was previously mentioned, the American paradigm’s emphasis on culture 
stemmed from the new social movement theory’s critique.  New social movement theorists 
differed from political process theorists in the American paradigm over the role of culture and 
identities.  Identity was not seen as a mediating cultural practice; the relationship was seen by 
new social movement theorists as being more complex (Vahabzadeh, 2001). 
 
The European Paradigm 
 
New social movement theory viewed contemporary movements as mirrors of conflicts 
found in the social and political structure of society (Rochon, 1990).  The new movements were 
seen as uncovering issues excluded by and from political discussions such as sexuality, gender, 
and the environment, to name just a few (Vahabzadeh, 2001).  Theorists within this paradigm 
emphasized the social status of the movement’s activists and ideological justifications of their 
demands (Rochon, 1990) and focused on struggles over symbolic, informational and cultural 
resources and rights to specify differences (Edelman, 2001).  Touraine (1988), among the first 
and most prolific advocates, posited that social movements have two dimensions (Edelman, 
2001).  Central to the first dimension was the notion of societal conflict, which created new 
identities, due to the presence of social cleavages.  The second dimension is that diverse 
collectivities had the capacity to act on and struggle for historicity.  Due to both dimensions, the 
“way of life” became the point of social contention and the struggles to effect relations of social 
domination were social movements. 
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Touraine’s student, Albert Melucci, coined the term “new social movement theory” 
(Vahabzadeh, 2001).  Melucci (1989) deemed identity the cardinal characteristic that 
distinguished new movements from the past.  He argued that movements had three dimensions, 
not two, as Touraine claimed. First, there was recognition among actors of commonalities and 
shared identities, objectives, and understandings.  Second, adversarial relations emerged with 
opponents competing for the same goods and values.  Finally, change occurred when actions 
exceeded tolerated limits of the social system (Vahabzadeh, 2001). Identity or the construction of 
“we” by a group of individuals emerged through common orientations organized around three 
axes (Vahabzadeh, 2001).  First, the relation of actors to the ends of their action provides 
direction.  Second, the relation of actors to the means through which the action is carried out 
illustrates the possibilities as well as the limits of action.  Finally, the relationship of actors to 
their environment identifies the field in which action takes place.  Taken together, these three 
axes produce collective action.  This, however, does not imply homogeneity (Vahabzadeh, 2001; 
Melucci, 1995 and 1984). 
Movements are not unified and homogenous.  Identity itself is a social phenomenon, 
derived from existing identity resources such as available cultural elements, which are obtained 
from the knowledge and information available in the society (Vahabzadeh, 2001; Melucci, 
1988). Identity finds in society the conditions or resources for its existence.  In movements, 
identity becomes emblematic of group and individual particularity.  Social movements are, 
therefore, action systems because they have structures built by present goals (Vahabzadeh, 2001; 
Melucci, 1985) and can be distinguished from other forms of collective action by conflict, 
solidarity, and breaking the system’s limits of compatibility (Vahabzadeh, 2001; Melucci, 1989; 
Diani and Melucci, 1988).    New social movements, thus, refer to the ongoing attempts at 
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political reinstitution of societies across the world, with action being a moment of creativity, in 
which decisions are made out of the possibilities that manifested themselves in the context of 
that action (Vahabzadeh, 2001). 
In contrast to the American paradigm, the new social movement theory has attempted to 
explain and, thereby, influence the development of movements outside developed countries.  The 
American paradigm had little influence outside developed countries because, according to 
Edelman (2001), political opportunity and processes were not seen as a significant explanatory 
category in developing countries where anti-American sentiment dominated.3  Consequently, 
new social movement theory was used more often and better received in the countries it sought 
to examine (Edelman, 2001).  The studies applied outside of Europe introduced concepts of 
economic and power inequalities as key dimensions of collective action.  The problem was that 
these studies were limited to Latin America.  For example, Collier (1994) introduced community 
factionalism and population growth as factors influencing dissatisfaction of segments within a 
population; Castells (1997) introduced informational movements, Nash (1997) introduced post-
modern movements, and Touraine (2000) introduced democratic guerrillas.  Studies on Latin 
America led researchers to reconsider approaches to collective action and new social movement 
theory (Edelman, 2001).    It led to a reclassification of movements from new social movements 
to an approach that was concerned primarily with concepts of class and distributive politics as 
they pertain to popular movements (Edelman, 2001; Foweraker, 1995).   The problem with new 
social movement theory and, later, popular movement theory was their lack of integration of 
structural factors to understand the links between symbols, ideas and meaning on the one hand 
                                                            
3 Anti-Americanism in the developing world was primarily a product of the negative effect of the American 
government’s policies.  A distinction was made between the American people and its government.  This does not 
imply American scholars did not attempt to apply their theoretical propositions to explain phenomenon in 
developing countries.  Rather, the claim made is that much of the scholarship was not respected or taken into 
consideration by the countries academics sought to explain. 
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and protest on the other (Edelman, 2001; Taylor and Whittier, 1995).  Consequently, recent 
scholarship has attempted to integrate both the American and European paradigms, especially 
given the dominance of the latter being applied to developing countries. 
 
The Integrative Approach 
 
 Renderings of an integrated approach began in the early 1990s, becoming more 
pronounced in the mid-1990s and clearer in the latter part of the 1990s.  Gamson (1992), who 
called for reconciliation, claimed that the construction of an alternative culture is not the only 
aim of collective action but also is an effective mechanism for mobilization, as movements may 
construct a collective identity to maximize strategic effectiveness (Sasson-Levy and Rapoport, 
2003).  Ruggiero (1999), another scholar calling for the integration of the American and 
European paradigms, posited that both paradigms share the premise that participants in collective 
action are embedded in social networks, which make the adoption of a shared identity and 
political mobilization possible.  Moreover, the paradigms shared common characteristics such as 
informal interaction networks, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action focusing on 
conflicts, and the use of protest (Ruggiero, 1999; Della Porta and Diani, 1998).  Therefore, 
within an integrated approach, the main processes of movements involve mounting collective 
challenge; reliance on social networks, common purposes, and cultural frameworks; and, the 
building of solidarity through connective structures and collective identities (Ruggiero, 1999; 
Tarrow, 1998). 
Despite the calls, a systematic integrative framework amalgamating the two theoretical 
paradigms does not exist.   The closest attempts thereto would be the works of Vasi (2006) and 
Simsek (2004).  Jon Bogdon Vasi (2006) posited that existing American and European 
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paradigms are not sufficient alone to explain contemporary movement mobilizations.4 This study 
also demonstrates that the paradigms are not sufficient alone to explain Islamic resistance 
movement mobilizations.    Contemporary mass mobilizations, according to Vasi, are better 
characterized by the concepts of miscible movements and miscible mobilizations.  Miscible 
movements, according to Vasi, are social movements with compatible ideologies or belief 
systems that can dissolve into one another, whereas miscible mobilizations are activities of 
communities and social movement organizations that overlap to a considerable degree.  These 
types of mobilizations result from the simultaneous mobilization efforts of miscible movements, 
not from a single movement’s mobilization efforts.  Moreover, external processes or variations in 
movements’ environments can increase or decrease the degree of miscibility influence 
mobilization.  The degree of miscibility is a function of the compatibility of belief systems and a 
function of the degree of overlap between communities.  The latter can fluctuate over time, while 
ideologies remain constant because of a trigger event and availability of modern communicative 
technologies.  Movements are more likely to engage in simultaneous mobilization efforts when 
movement sympathizers and activists have easy access to alternative sources of information and 
are easily connected to one another. 
Despite utility, the problem with Vasi’s attempt at theory integration is that it does not 
tell us much about the why and how of contemporary movements.   Although commended for his 
attempt at theory construction, the premises posited are weak.  Ideological overlap may exist, but 
movements—old, new and contemporary—are not homogenous entities.  Dissolution of 
movements into one another is also unlikely.  Movements may cooperate and coordinate their 
activities, but they also simultaneously attempt to maintain an identity separate from that of other 
                                                            
4 Here, contemporary movements are used to emphasize the difference between movements today in contrast to 
‘new movements’ postulated by Melucci and others.   
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like-minded movement organizations.  An example of an attempt to maintain a distinct identity 
can be seen in the mobilization of the various braches of the Muslim Brotherhood society outside 
of Egypt in the 1930s (the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt’s creation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Society of the West Bank and Gaza in 1935).  Another example could be seen in the 
organizational structure of contemporary Islamic resistance movements, wherein each 
organizational apparatus of a particular movement is independent. 
Vasi’s premise that contemporary movements are characterized by miscible 
mobilizations is also weak.  Strategies for mobilizations may overlap, but they vary given 
temporal and spatial differentiations.  Vasi does not make clear whether he is referring to 
movements in America and Europe or whether he is specifically referring to movements dealing 
with gender, sexual orientation, or environmental issues.  Regardless of the movements referred 
to and the environments in which they are located, contemporary movements will work in 
tandem with one another because they share common ideologies, goals, and objectives.  
However, symbolic differentiation of ideology and the methods employed exist to maintain a 
distinct identity from that of other movements.  Again, this can be seen through the study of 
contemporary Islamic resistance movements—those engaged in violent and non-violent 
resistance—and within those movements, specifically within their organizational structures. 
Simsek (2004), another theorist attempting to create an integrative framework, 
consolidated the different movement characteristics of the American and European paradigms 
and applied them to both secular and Islamic social movements in Turkey.  Based on his 
consolidated framework and findings, Simsek compiled a list of common characteristics shared 
by contemporary movements.  First,   movements exhibit post-Marxist, post-modernist, and post-
traditional tendencies.  By this, they appear as critiques to socialist ideology, modernization 
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processes, nation building, secularization, urbanization, the welfare state, and traditional 
understandings of religion and morality.   Second, movements are overwhelmingly comprised of 
the middle-class.  Third, movements have post-material, identity-oriented initiatives that demand 
public and political space for their characteristics, interests, and problems.  Fourth, movements 
are both proactive and particularistic.  That is, they are not merely reactions to some kind of 
oppression or deprivation.  Instead, they are voluntary and enthusiastic initiatives that raise 
public consciousness about a particular issue.  Finally, movements display relatively 
decentralized and less-hierarchical modes of organization, as well as forms of action (Simsek, 
2004). 
Nonetheless, the problem with Simsek’s integrative framework is that it does not provide 
consolidated assumptions.  In all fairness, this is largely due to the difficulty in consolidating the 
assumptions for both paradigms.  Consequently, Simsek summarizes each paradigm’s 
assumptions separately.  Assumptions of the American paradigm, according to him, are as 
follows:  that social movements are to be understood through a conflict perspective, with there 
being no difference between institutional and non-institutional collective action; that collective 
action enables groups to defend their interests in a rational way; that formation of movements 
depend on the availability of resources and opportunities; and, that success is measured by 
whether or not it is recognized as a political actor and if an increase can be observed in material 
benefits.  Assumptions of the European paradigm, according to Simsek, are as follows:  that they 
are comprised of middle-class participants; that movements are characterized by status other than 
class such as religion, gender, and sexual preference; that they are responses to the politicization 
of everyday life, modernity and post-modernity and, thus, address a wide social context, seeking 
post-material values; that their role of symbolic and cultural resistance is essential; and, finally, 
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that they are organized in decentralized, egalitarian and participatory organizational forms 
(Simsek, 2004:115-118). 
Another problem with Simsek’s integrated framework is that it fails to incorporate the 
transnational aspects of contemporary movements.  A transnational approach examines the 
mobilization of transnational movements, which are catalysts for globalization from below.  In 
1993, Falk introduced the phrase globalization from below, referring to civil society, which links 
transnational societal concerns with a vision for a human community, organizing across borders 
and raising connections (Edelman, 2001).  Research in this area from the mid to late 1990s, 
however, focused on transnational organizations, specifically those that had crossed one or two 
adjacent borders, composing issue-oriented bi-national coalitions (Fox, 2000; Cunningham, 
1999; Ayres, 1998).  Scholars have also looked at globalization from below in terms of 
antecedents, protest repertories, geographic reach, and the theoretical and strategic underpinnings 
of globalization.  For example, Rissen-Kappen (1995) examined how international governance 
structures legitimize transnational activists’ efforts, increase their access to national politics, and 
bolster capacity to form effective coalitions.  Other studies examining the transnational effect on 
movements include these of Smith et al., (1997), Waterman (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998). 
The argument posited by theorists calling for a transnational framework views 
movements as a part of the growing interconnected global society that have more often than not 
become transnational in nature (Edelman, 2001; Mooney and Majka, 1995; Ritchie, 1996). 
Movements have become transnational in nature in areas where regional economic integration 
and supranational governance were making their weight felt at the local level.  The problem, 
however, according to Waterman (1998) and Appaduri (2000), is that there was little or no 
strategic examination or articulation of a global movement theory.  Contemporary movements 
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are a global phenomenon, but the context of their emergence is, more often than not, neither 
global nor are their organization forms, struggles or objectives (Vahabzadeh, 2001). These 
movements, according to Appaduri, are part networks, part movements, and part organizations, 
which require a new theory of explanation.  This study, however, does not attempt to fill the 
theoretical void by developing an integrated theoretical framework.  Instead, it seeks to examine 
contemporary Islamic resistance movements through the American and European paradigms for 
determining whether they are generalizable, irrespective of time, space, and type of movement.     
 
Summary of the Theoretical Paradigms 
 
 As stated, the theoretical framework employed was derived from the American and 
European paradigms.  In the American paradigm, theorists posited that contemporary movements 
are a product of the political context.  That is, political climate independent of movement 
mobilization affects the outcome of movements (Edelman, 2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; 
Tarrow, 1998; Rochon, 1990).  Movements, therefore, are symptoms of socio-economic crises 
(Edelman, 2001), deprivation and structural differentiation (Champagne 1983), which provide 
political opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999).  Mobilization is made possible by 
movements, who are socially connected, using political opportunities to expand and gain a stake 
in the political and social system (Edelman, 2001; Cohen, 1985).  They do so by relying on the 
linkages between individuals, organizations and institutions, which blurs the line between them 
and established political channels such as political parties (Rochon, 1990).  The blurring of the 
line results in changes in the level of elite receptivity, changes in elite ability and willingness to 
repress movements, and the presence of elite allies (Edelman, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Rochon, 
1990).  It also influences the type of protest, as both strategies and tactics are not chosen in a 
vacuum (Meyer 1999).  Choice of action, then, depends on whether there is greater or less 
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openness/access (structural differentiation) and political opportunities (repression, participation, 
and resources) available (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1992; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 1973).  The 
explanatory variables the American paradigm is concerned with include socio-economic crises, 
deprivation, structural differentiation, political opportunities, elite receptivity, and choice of 
action. 
The American failed to consider the role identities play in mobilization.  Theorists within 
the European paradigm posited that contemporary movements were mirrors of conflicts found in 
society (Rochon, 1990).  This is because conflict creates new-shared identities based on existing 
social cleavages (Touraine, 1988).  Identities produce collective action or mobilization 
(Vahabzadeh, 2001) to effect relations of social domination (Edelman, 2001).  The process of 
mobilization, according to the European paradigm, is determined by the relation of actors to the 
ends of their action, which provides the possibilities and limits of their action; and, by the 
relationship of actors to their environment, which identifies the field in which action takes place.  
The variables that this paradigm is concerned with include conflict, social cleavages, identity, 
and social domination. 
For each paradigm, mobilization was explained differently.  The American paradigm is 
strategy oriented and posited that mobilization was the product of movement activists 
(entrepreneurs) strategically using political opportunities, provided by political context and 
grievances.  The European paradigm is not strategy oriented and posited that mobilization was a 
product of the social environment creating shared identities among movement activists.  The 
following table summarizes and contrasts the paradigms. 
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a. Deprivation 
2. Structural Differentiation 
a. Autonomous Political Institutions 
b. Access to Institutions 
c. Government Use of Repression 






















2. Social Cleavages 
3. Identity 
4. Social Domination 
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 This chapter sought to introduce the objectives of this study and to review the existing 
literature on social movements.  As stated, the study seeks to examine contemporary Islamic 
resistance movements in Algeria, Palestine, and the Philippines.  The emphasis on Islamic 
resistance movements is due in part to the lack of scholarship within the social movement 
literature on these types of movements and, in part, due to the lack of scholarship within the 
literature on Islamic resistance movements on social movement theory.  This study, therefore, 
seeks to bridge the gap.  The emphasis on movements in Algeria, Palestine and the Philippines is 
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due to the lack of social movement scholarship on these geographical regions.  Social movement 
scholarship has been limited primarily to America, Europe, Latin America, and South Africa.  
The movements studied herein are located in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.   
Theoretically, this study joins social movement scholars calling for an integrated approach.  
Finally, by focusing on contemporary Islamic resistance movements, it seeks to identify common 
mobilization characteristics and to develop generalizable propositions regarding these 
movements. 
Organization of the Rest of the Study 
 Chapter two sets forth the research methodology employed.  The study utilizes structured, 
focused comparative case studies.  It employs a common set of questions across cases to ensure 
acquisition of comparable data collection for the development of generalizable propositions.  
Chapters three through five examine the mobilization of each movement, within each country.  
In each of the chapters, movement mobilizations are examined in terms of the American and 
European paradigms.  Chapter six draws conclusions based on chapters three through five.  






Research Design and Method:  
Comparing Mobilizations of Contemporary Islamic Resistance Movements 
 
 
The major questions posed in the previous chapter were whether Islamic resistance 
movements share common mobilization characteristics; and, if so, whether generalizable 
propositions could be posited regarding their mobilization.  Providing answers to these questions 
is the primary concern of this dissertation.  According to the literature presented in the first 
chapter, mobilization refers to the formation or creation of the movement.  Mobilization of 
movements is not the same as the evolution of movements, which is not the purview of this 
study. 
This study employs a comparative case approach, which permits a cross-case 
examination of the mobilization of the six movements through the American and European 
paradigms within the social movement literature.  Examining mobilization from the vantage of 
each of the paradigms will pave the way for the future development of an integrated approach, 
which the literature posits is necessary. The second section focuses on the research design 
specifically.  In particular, it will review the six Islamic resistance movements and the reason for 
their selection; and, how the variables from the American and European paradigms will be 
assessed and compared.  
The Comparative Case Study Approach 
 Previous studies within the social movement literature examine mobilization on a case-
by-case and country specific basis (Edelman, 2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999).  These studies 
are multifaceted, detailed, conceptually rich, and multidimensional.  Nevertheless, the lack of 
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comparison across cases prohibits the articulation of generalizable propositions.  That is, general 
hypotheses inferred from a single case study may have no theoretical value outside of the case 
itself (Lijphart, 1997).  Because of this, social movement researchers need to conduct and 
compare multiple cases so they can strengthen their results via pattern matching.  In particular, 
analysts need to employ the comparative method, which is highly conducive to hypothesis 
generation.  The comparative method, according to Lijphart (1971), permits the establishment of 
general empirical propositions by discovering relationships among the variables.  It is also 
considered the first step for generating theory (Yin, 1994; Lijphart, 1971).   
Two types of cases, according to Lijphart (1971), are conducive to developing general 
propositions.  These are theory confirming or infirming cases and deviant cases.  Theory 
confirming cases are those wherein knowledge of the case is limited to a single variable or to 
none of the variables that theoretical propositions posit.  In this study, only the outcome variable 
of mobilization is known.  A common outcome variable is sufficient for case selection when the 
explanatory variables are of theoretical concern (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Yin, 1994; 
Lijphart, 1971).  All six Islamic resistance movements selected mobilized at different times, this 
study is interested in determining if they did so in a similar fashion.  The theoretical propositions 
posited by the American and European paradigms are used to direct the investigation of each 
movement’s mobilization. 
In contrast to theory confirming cases, deviant cases are those that attempt to identify 
differences to explain a particular phenomenon (Lijphart, 1971).  The purpose of deviant cases is 
to cast light on the exceptional and the atypical.  In particular, cases selected must differ 
according to some variable, which is known, for developing general propositions regarding their 
difference.  While all of the cases in this study are similar based on the outcome variable, 
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differences among them exist regarding the form protest.  Two of the movements adopted violent 
protest as part of their mobilization strategy whereas the others used non-violent protest. The 
difference regarding the form of protest will permit the identification of those variables from the 
American and European paradigm that help to explain the variation.  In particular, it will permit 
the development of hypotheses as to why some movements resorted to violent protest instead of 
non-violent protest and vice versa.    
Finally, each of the cases—the six contemporary Islamic movements—are examined to 
determine how the variables which are the focus of the paradigms shape mobilization.  While 
several of the movements are located within the same country, they constitute separate cases, 
according to Lijphart, because mobilization occurred at different times. Again, referring back to 
Lijphart, cases can be expanded both temporally and spatially for determining whether the 
explanatory variables are generalizable across cases.  The explanatory variables posited by the 
American and European paradigms should be present across the cases, despite movement 
mobilization at different times or places.  Presence across cases will therefore allow for 
confirmation of the theoretical propositions on mobilization posited by the paradigms. 
Comparing across cases for confirming or rejecting theory is more conducive to the development 
of general propositions (Lijphart 1970). 
 
The Research Design 
 
This section outlines the organization of each case study; discusses the criteria for case 
selection; identifies the variables posited by the American and European paradigms and the 
structured questions used for data collection; and, concludes with a discussion of the means 
employed to compare across cases. 
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Each chapter opens with an overview of the historical context in which each movement 
emerged.  Movements are rooted in their past, regardless of whether they are contemporary 
phenomenon or not (Touraine, 1988).  Moreover, the socio-cultural and political contexts of the 
time when they mobilized are a product of history. 
Each case is then discussed with respect to the variables posited by the American and 
European paradigms in a focused, structured case design. Each of these cases are examined 
immediately prior to and at the time of mobilization.  Mobilization refers to the creation or 
emergence of movements in particular times and places.  According to the social movement 
literature, when studies are concerned with how and why movements mobilized, it is the time of 
their initial mobilization that must be examined (Vasi, 2006; Semsek, 2004; Vahabzadeh, 2001; 
Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Yiftachel, 1997; Herman, 1995; Melucci, 1980; Gurr, 1970).  The 
FIS initially mobilized in 1989; PIJ in 1980; Hamas in 1987; the MNLF in 1969; the MILF in 
1977; and, the ASG in 1991.  At the time of their mobilization, the FIS, the PIJ, Hamas and the 
MNLF engaged in non-violent resistance, whereas the MILF and the ASG engaged in violent 
resistance.  The PIJ and Hamas did not engage in violent resistance until after their initial 
mobilizations. 
The cases were selected for several reasons.  First, Islamic resistance movements in 
general and these cases in particular, have not been examined for the most part within social 
movement theory.  Simsek (2006), who examined Islamic political organizations in comparison 
to other non-Muslim organizations in Turkey, is the exception. Like Simsek this study is an 
effort to postulate an integrative framework within social movement theory that applies to 
Islamic resistance movements. Second, existing studies on Islamic resistance movements have 
not examined mobilization on a cross-case basis.  Studies have been limited to in-depth historical 
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case analysis on single groups or on single countries.  The mobilization of Islamic resistance 
movements have not been examined for identifying generalizable propositions common across 
countries and regions.  Third, the cases were selected due to their geographical location.  Social 
movement theory, as mentioned in chapter one, has largely been confined to the study of 
movements in America, Europe, Latin America, and South Africa.  The cases herein span the 
Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia. Fourth, these specific cases were selected to 
further research previously conducted on their transition (the FIS, Hamas and the MNLF) and 
potential transition (the PIJ, the MILF, and the ASG) from resistance movement to political 
parties (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  Finally, the cases were selected to facilitate theory 
testing.  The American and European paradigms should explain mobilization irrespective of 
time, space, and the type of movements.  Given that social movement theory has not examined 
Islamic resistance movement, with the exception of Semsek (2006), the cases become even more 
relevant in testing whether the propositions of the American and European paradigm are in fact 
generalizable. 
 
Movement Mobilization from the American Paradigm 
 
For the American paradigm, movement mobilization is a product of activists utilizing 
political opportunities provided by the environment.  Chapter one summarized the theoretical 
propositions utilized in this study for examining the mobilization of Islamic resistance 
movements.  Given the main premise of the American paradigm, it is posited that activists 
utilized political opportunities provided by the environment where they live to mobilize to create 
the movement.  To explain mobilization for each movement, structured questions were used to 
guide data collection.  The following chart summarized the variables, the coding categories, the 











Yes/No Were socio-economic crises present?  If so, did they lead 
to deprivation? 
UNDP-HDI, UNCTAD, and 
Quantitative Expert Studies. 
Deprivation Yes/No Was deprivation present?  If so, was it caused by the 
presence of crises? 




Yes/No Was governance structurally differentiation?  Was 




Crises/Deprivation Did movements utilize these for mobilization? Movement Documents and 
Expert Studies directly 
quoting movement members. 
Structural Differentiation Did movement use the level of structural differentiation 
for mobilization? 
Movement Documents and 
Expert Studies directly 
quoting movement members. 
Level of Repression Did government use repression?  If so, did movements 
use it for mobilization? 
Political Terror Score/ Expert 
Studies/ Movement 
Documents. 
Government Provision of 
Resource 
Did the governing authority provide resources to society 
for subsistence?  Did movements use this for 
mobilization? 
Expert studies/ Movement 
Documents. 
Access to Resources Did society have access to resources?  Did movements 





Were political institutions free from government 
manipulation?  Use by movement? 
Expert Studies/Movement 
Documents. 
Movement Access to Political 
Institutions 
Did society have access to political institutions?  Use by 
movements? 




Yes/No Were there changes in elite receptivity to the use of 
repression?  Did elites attempt to redress societal 
grievances?  Use by movements? 
Expert studies/ Movement 
Documents. 
 
Socio-economic crises are defined as unstable socio-economic conditions, where 
resources are inadequate to cope with the environment (Mishara, 1996; Webb, 1994; Starbuck 
and Hedberg, 1977).  Presence and absence of crises were determined based on the following 
two criteria.  First, if the UNDP-HDI characterized the country’s economic development as 
medium or low, crises were considered present.5  The HDI measures access to opportunities such 
as education, healthcare, income, employment, GDP and other socio-economic indicators to rank 
countries for determining whether they are of high, medium or low development.  The HDI 
                                                            




considers medium and low development countries as experiencing crises.  Data was only 
available for Algeria and the Philippines beginning in 1975.  The UNDP characterized both 
Algeria and the Philippines as having medium development.  The HDI could not be used for 
Palestine because the index does not begin collecting separate data for the territories until 1994. 
For Palestine, the UNCTAD Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People was used 
as a primary source for socio-economic crises.6  The presence of crisis was determined based on 
their findings.  The HDI and the UNCTAD sources were limited because they did not indicate 
the nature of socio-economic crises present.  Due to this limitation, expert studies were also 
utilized to determine the presence or absence of crises and their nature.   Expert studies 
indicating the presence or absence of crises provided the second criterion.  Only studies where 
experts relied on quantitative measures for determining presence or absence and had a well-
defined methodology were utilized.  If crises were present, then the answer to the question 
indicated in Table 1 was yes. 
Deprivation was defined as widespread socio-economic and cultural dissatisfaction with 
the existing status quo, which is perceived as inadequate to provide ordinary satisfaction 
(Champagne 1983; Barbar 1941).  Its presence or absence was determined by the following two 
criteria.  First,   if the UNDP-HPI characterized the level of human deprivation in the country as 
medium or low standard of living, then it was considered present.7  The HPI measures the most 
basic dimension of deprivation, namely short life, lack of basic education, and lack of access to 
public and private resources.  It specifically measures deprivation, whereas the HDI measures 
development.  Similar to the HDI, data were only available for Algeria and the Philippines. 
                                                            
6 See the UNCTAD Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People at 
http://r0.unctad.org/palestine/statistics.htm for more information. 
 




Expert studies for Palestine were specifically relied on for determining the presence or 
absence and nature of deprivation.  Expert studies were also used for Algeria and the Philippines. 
Thus, expert studies indicating the presence or absence of crises provided the second criterion.  
Only studies using quantitative measures for determining presence or absence were utilized.  If 
deprivation was present, then the answer to the first question on the variable in Table 1 was yes.   
The same expert studies were also used to determine the nature of deprivation and its causes.  If 
the studies determined that socio-economic crises led to deprivation, then the answers to the 
second set of questions pertaining to the variables were yes. 
Structural differentiation was defined as a process where a structure or institution 
differentiates into more than one structure or institution that are structurally distinct, but taken 
together function as a whole (Rueschemeyer 1977; Smelser 1959).  The type of governance 
structure; whether political institutions were free from government manipulation; and, whether 
political participation was permitted or prohibited indicated structural differentiation.  The 
indicators related to structural differentiation included access to and autonomous political 
institutions, access to and government provisions of resources, elite receptivity and repression.  
Greater structural differentiation was considered present if participation was not prohibited and 
institutions were free from government manipulation.  If there was greater structural 
differentiation, the answer to the first question pertaining to this variable listed in Table 1 was 
yes.  If the answer was no, then the level of differentiation was sought.  Lack of structural 
differentiation was considered present, 1) if participation was prohibited; or, 2) if it was limited 
in the sense that participation was subject to government manipulation.   Transitional structural 
differentiation was considered present if there were changes in the governance structure either 
permitting or prohibiting participation.  Data for structural differentiation were derived from 
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expert studies detailing the history of the governance structure.  Similar to the other variables 
where expert studies were relied on, a detailed methodology had to be used by the expert to 
determine yes or no and the type of differentiation. 
Repressive practices include, but are not limited to, discriminatory policies8 and human 
rights abuses such as violence and imprisonment.  The Political Terrorism Scale (1976-2006) 
measured the governing authority’s use of repression against its population.9  It ranks countries 
on five levels.  The first level characterizes countries that have a secure rule of law; where people 
are not imprisoned for their view; and, where the use of torture or political murder is rare or 
exceptional.  The second level characterizes countries that have a limited amount of 
imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but where the few persons affected experience 
torture, beatings, and political murder.  The third level three characterizes countries that have 
extensive political imprisonment or a recent history of such imprisonment; where execution or 
other political murders and brutality are common; and, where unlimited detention, with or 
without a trial, for political views is accepted.  The fourth level characterizes countries where 
civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population; and, where 
the use of murder, disappearance and torture are a common part of life.  The last, level five, is 
the most extreme and characterizes countries that use terrorism against the entire population; 
and, where leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue 
personal or ideological goals. 
In this study, a country’s ranking of one through four indicated the presence or absence of 
repression, with a ranking of level one indicating absence.  A ranking of four or five was 
                                                            
8 Discriminatory policies included prohibition on the right to express dissent (Alexander 2002) and the formation of 
political collectivities.   
 
9 Please see the Political Terrorism Scale at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ for more information. 
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considered to indicate widespread use of repression.  Any ranking lower than four, but other than 
one, was considered to indicate the lack of widespread use of repression.  Expert studies were 
relied on to determine the presence and level of repression prior to 1976 in the case of the 
Philippines.  They were also used to supplement the PTS rankings in Algeria, Palestine and the 
Philippines.  Similar to the previous criteria, only studies that had a defined methodology for 
determining the presence or absence of repression were used.  The determination of the presence 
or absence of repression was needed before the question as to whether movements utilized this as 
an opportunity for mobilization could be answered. 
The level of structural differentiation and the use of repression provide political 
opportunities for activists to use for mobilization.  The level of structural differentiation provides 
an opportunity because it determines whether activists have access to the governance structure to 
redress societal grievances, which are a product of socio-economic crises and deprivation.  The 
use of repression provides an opportunity because it informs the nature of the actions available to 
activists.  The use of socio-economic crises, deprivation, structural differentiation, repression and 
elite receptivity were determined by activists’ reference to them in their documents, speeches or 
interviews.  Expert studies that directly quoted movement activists, documents or speeches were 
also utilized.  If movement sources did not directly reference the variables and their indicators, 
then they were not considered as having been used by movement activists.  The movement 
documents will be discussed in the section on data collection, following the next section on 
mobilization from the European paradigm. 
 
Movement Mobilization from the European Paradigm 
 
For the European paradigm, movement mobilization is a product of the creation of a 
shared identity.  It differs from the American paradigm because it asks the question of why rather 
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than how movements mobilize.  Chapter one summarized the theoretical propositions utilized in 
this study for examining the mobilization of Islamic resistance movements.  Given the main 
premise of the paradigm, it is posited that a shared identity resulted in mobilization.  To explain 
why movements mobilized, structured questions were used to guide data collection.  The 
following chart summarized the variables, the coding categories, the indicators/questions, and the 
sources, which is followed by a discussion. 




Conflict Yes/No Was conflict present at the time of movement 
mobilization?   
Uppsala Conflict Database 
and Expert Studies. 
Social 
Cleavages 
Yes/No Were cleavages present?  What type of cleavage?  What 
led to the salience of those cleavages?  Which cleavage 
were movements able to overcome? 
Expert Studies and 
Movement Documents. 
Identity Yes/No Did each of the movements have a shared identity?  Was 
their shared identity based on existing social cleavages? 
Movement Documents and 




Yes/No Did the movements mobilize for affecting relations of 
domination? 
Movement Documents and 
Expert Studies quoting 
movement members. 
 
Conflict was defined using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s definition.  Conflict “is 
a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force results in at least 25 battle deaths” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).10  This study is 
concerned only with intrastate conflict, which is defined by Uppsala as occurring between the 
government and a non-government party.  The database is limited because it does not provide 
details as to the nature of the conflict.  Consequently, expert studies were also used as a 
supplement.  If armed conflict was present, then the answer to the question pertaining to this 
variable listed in Table 2 was yes. 
                                                            




Social cleavages are defined by Yonhyok Choe (2002: 7-8) as a division of social 
members into different factions of individuals, groups, and organizations, which are broken into 
two categories.  The first category is segmental cleavages such as divisions based on tribe, 
family, race, caste, language, region, sex, occupation, urban-rural, religion, or generation.  The 
second category is value-related cleavages such as ideological or socio-economic cleavages such 
as education, income and class.  The types of cleavages, their nature and causes were determined 
as being present or absent based on expert studies that had a well-defined methodology.  The 
identification of the cause was necessary to answer the question as to whether conflict or 
something else exacerbated existing cleavages prior to and at the time of movement 
mobilization. 
The determination of the presence or absence, the nature, and cause of the cleavages were 
needed to answer the questions related to whether the movement’s identity was based on existing 
cleavages.  Identity, first introduced by Tajfel (1997: 292), refers to “the individual’s knowledge 
that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value 
significance to him [or her] of this group’s membership” (Hogg and Terry, 2000).    Movement 
documents and expert studies that quoted movement activists or speeches were used to determine 
whether activists’ identity was shaped by cleavages.  Identity was considered to be shaped by 
existing cleavages: 1) if a movement’s leadership or membership included individuals from the 
cleavage categories; or, 2) if a movement’s platform addressed concerns related to the cleavages.  
For example, calling for or implementing programs to assist women in Palestinian society was 
considered a direct reference to addressing an existing gender cleavage. 
Finally, social domination refers to the dominance and subordination of one collectivity 
over another, which results in a social hierarchy denoting inequalities such as status differentials 
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and unequal power distributions (Thapa, 1988).  Mobilization for domination was determined by 
a movement’ documents or expert studies that directly quoted movement material or activists. 
From these, the type of domination could also be identified.  For example, if reference was made 
to military rule, control or dominance, then the type was identified as military domination.  The 
reliance on movement sources for this study makes this study of Islamic resistance movement 
mobilization unique. 
 
Data Collection for Mobilization 
 Mobilization of activists for protest is an interesting phenomenon.  To understand it more 
thoroughly, ethnographic research was engaged in during the summer of 2007 in Palestine.  
Ethnographic fieldwork permits and understanding of the behavior and thought of the 
phenomenon under study (Madison, 2005; Goulon, 1995).  Through ethnographic fieldwork, I 
participated in and observed non-violent protests; received training on how to deal with the 
Israeli soldiers’ potential use of ammunition and tear gas and to prevent against arrest; and, 
interviewed organizers of the protests on mobilization and symbolism.  The forms of non-violent 
protests engaged in differed, ranging from assisting in the construction of houses destroyed by 
the Israeli Defense Force, observing checkpoints and settlement construction, to participating in 
demonstrations. Non-violent demonstrations occurred every Friday at different times and 
locations throughout the West Bank.  In addition to participating in non-violent forms of protest, 
I interviewed elected officials from Fatah, Hamas and the PIJ.  In the interviews, questions 
pertained to social and political context, identity, symbolism, goals, and the use and effectiveness 
of protest (violent/non-violent).   The combination of ethnographic techniques informed only my 




 The study of the why and how of their mobilizations was informed by the use of 
movement documents, speeches and interviews.  In the case of the Islamic Salvation Front, 
documents, speeches and interviews in both Arabic and French were obtained from the 
movement’s information bureau.  In the case of the PIJ, documents, speeches and interviews in 
Arabic were obtained from the information bureau of the movement’s political wing; and, from 
the information bureau of al-Saraya al-Quds Brigades, which is the movement’s military wing.   
In the case of Hamas, documents, speeches and interviews in Arabic were obtained from the 
information bureau of the political wing; and, from the information bureau of al-Ezzedine al-
Qassam Brigades, which is the movement’s military wing.  The cases of the MNLF, the MILF 
and the ASG were the only movements where documents could not be obtained.  For these 
movements, secondary sources that directly quoted movement activists, documents or speeches 
were used.  Secondary sources that directly quoted movement activists or material were also 
used for the FIS, the PIJ and Hamas.  Analysis of the documents followed the criteria set forth in 
the sections on the American and European paradigms. 
Movement sources and expert studies that directly quoted movement sources were 
determined to be the best method for acquiring an understanding of how and why they 
mobilized.  According to Geertz (1973), the “other” can only be known and understood from 
their perspective.  Reliance on secondary analysis limits the credibility of understanding the how 
and why of actors’ actions and poses issues of bias.  All researchers have their biases, but to rely 
on secondary analysis of movement ideas, goals and actions perpetuates those existing biases and 
distorts the perspective of the “other.” The reliance of movement sources also presents an issue 





an understanding of the why and how movements mobilized was to understand it from the 
perspective of the activist. 
 
Comparing Islamic Resistance Movements’ Mobilizations 
While the mobilizations of the six contemporary Islamic resistance movements are 
treated separately, the evidence found therein are analyzed comparatively in the final chapter of 
this study.  Comparative analysis is used to tabulate those explanatory variables that are common 
across cases to explain mobilization.  It is also used to tabulate the explanatory variables that are 
specific to only movements engaged in violent resistance.  Through comparative analysis, this 
study will be able to identify whether Islamic resistance movements share common mobilization 




This chapter sought to present the research methodology, which compares the 
mobilization of six contemporary Islamic resistance movements that differ temporally and 
spatially.  The first section of this chapter examined why comparative analysis was used.  The 
second section examined the research design specifically.  In particular, it reviewed the six 
Islamic resistance movements and the reason for their selection.  Then, it defined and identified 
the explanatory variables posited by the American and European paradigms to help explain 






Mobilizing the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria 
 
 This chapter examines the case of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).1  Formed in 1989, 
the FIS was an effort by various Algerian Muslim groups to create a unified collectivity to 
challenge the FLN politically.  Through consultation, Muslim political activists determined that 
creating separate political entities would divide rather than unite the Islamist movement (Islamic 
Salvation Front, 2003).  Division, the FIS believed, would prevent an effective challenge to the 
National Liberation Front (FLN).  Despite its recent mobilization, the FIS is rooted in and shaped 
by the historical development of Algerian nationalism, as the following section demonstrates. 
 
Brief History of Algeria from French Colonization to Independence (1830-1962) 
 
 Colonization or foreign occupation influenced the historical development of all the 
countries included in this study, but only Algeria and the Philippines were able to obtain a 
sovereign entity to call home.  The French colonized Algeria for 132 years before it achieved 
independence in 1962, after an eight-year rebellion (Burke III, 1998; Celik, 1996; Gillespie, 
1960).  Given this long history, a brief survey of French colonization is necessary to understand 
the development of Algerian nationalism.  This section will briefly examine the conditions prior 
to and during the period of French colonization, the development of Algerian nationalism, and 
                                                            
1 Not examining other movements in Algeria for identifying dissimilarities could present a weakness.  The overall 
study is concerned with taking a sample of the mobilization of movements across geographical locations and 
temporal differences. Consequently, the examination of one movement in Algeria was felt to be sufficient given that 
the majority of the other movements mobilized simultaneously and had similar mobilization patterns.  FIS is the 
only movement examined in Algeria for several reasons.  First, the other contemporary Islamic movements in 
Algeria were created by the FLN simultaneously to counter-balance FIS (Entelis, 1992; Also see the discussion 
under the variable structural differentiation for further explanation).  Second, FIS represented the Islamic bloc (Tahi, 
1995). Finally, the overall study is not focused on making in-country generalizations.            
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the Algerian Muslim Rebellion of 1954.  The latter led to the FLN and its dominance in the 
governance system. 
Prior to French colonization, the Turks dominated Algeria under the Ottoman Empire 
(Gillespie, 1960).  Before their arrival, the region had multiple kingdoms, fiefdoms and other 
divisions (Reudy, 2005).  The arrival of the Turks in historic Algeria established a collective 
political identity between the 16th and 18th Centuries.  Turkish military rule was turbulent and 
marked by assassinations, revolts, and massacres due to Algeria’s strategic location within the 
region (Reudy, 2005; Gillespie, 1960).  Although it had become increasingly independent by the 
17th Century, economic crises and power inequalities of the 18th Century provided the conditions 
that led Turkish authorities to surrender to the French in 1830.  While the Turkish rulers 
surrendered quietly, the same cannot be said for the local Arab and Berber populations.  Emir 
Abd El-Kader led an armed rebellion against the French for 17 years that ended in 1871 (Burke, 
1998; Gillespie, 1960).  The rebellion, according to Gillespie (1960: 20), was not due to the 
invasion but rather Algerian attachment to the land and Islam, both of which the French denied 
to Algerians. 
From the 1830s to the end of 1870, France governed Algeria militarily, suppressing all 
forms of culture and socio-cultural institutions not deemed progressive or modern.  This 
suppression in part fueled the El-Kader Rebellion that lasted until 1871.  Afterward, Algerians 
protested peacefully until the 1907 Young Algerian Revolt.  This revolt was significant in 
Algerian political history because it was the first time Algerians created a political party, even if 
it did not last long.  There was a short break in French military governance from 1848 to 1852, 
when the Colons (European settlers) were able to wrestle control from the military.  Their rule 
ended in 1852 with the passage of the French Constitution, which prohibited Algeria from 
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having legislative representation.  Despite this, from 1848 to 1945, the civilian administration 
consisted of 24 Algerian Muslims and 48 Colons.  The Colons were able to regain control of the 
governance structure in 1870.  From 1870 to independence, the Colons dominated the Algerian 
governance structure, with a few “Muslim Yes-men” (Gillespie, 1960: 75) incorporated into the 
system in 1898. 
The Colon’s alienation of Muslims led to the first Algerian Muslim Rebellion of 1945.  
The trigger event for the rebellion was widespread use of repression by the Colons to 
demonstrations.  Demonstrations occurred following the celebrations of allied victory and 
changes in the scheduled Algerian elections.  Elections were changed out of the Colons fear that 
Algerian secessionist candidates would win the elections.  The 1945 revolt ultimately resulted in 
the passage of the 1947 Statute, which granted Algerians additional rights such as easier access 
to citizenship and greater electoral participation.  Previously, the granting of citizenship 
depended on Algerians renouncing their rights granted by Islam.  However, the recognition of 
rights and their actual implementation were two different stories.  Equal representation was never 
realized, despite the role Algerians played in the two World Wars. 
The failed enforcement of the statute was due, in part, to pro-Algerian, liberal elites in 
France being preoccupied with French domestic problems.  It was also due to the armed 
insurrections against French rule in Morocco and Tunisia.  Consequently, the Colons were able 
to reassert their political control in Algeria, which resulted in the removal of Algerian Muslims 
elected to the Algerian Assembly.  This further polarized the Algerian Muslim masses and the 
Colons.  Polarization provided a strong base for the quasi-political collectivities calling for 
secession, which facilitated Algerian nationalist sentiment. 
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An Algerian nationalist sentiment, according to Burke (1998), began to take shape in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s through historical wars fought discursively between the French 
(Colons) and the Algerians.  The Colons defined themselves as the bearers of progress and the 
Algerians defined the French and the Colons, in particular, as oppressors who deprived them of 
their culture and history.  In so doing, Algerians emphasized the violent nature of the French 
conquest and the continued suppression of the Algerian people, the illegitimate appropriation of 
land and resources, and the inequality wrought by the colonial governance structure (Burke, 
1998; Gillespie, 1960).  National discourse, therefore, was built around the notion that victims 
can only know the “other” by the scars and chains that imprison their mind, body, and soul 
(Fanon, 1963: 13).  These conditions gave rise to the development of quasi-political collectivities 
that worked within the French framework. 
Prior to the 1954 rebellion, Algerians worked within the French framework and through 
French political parties (Gillespie, 1960).  For example, in 1927, Messali Ahmed Ben Hadj, the 
father of Algerian nationalism, worked with the French Communist Party to create the North 
African Star (ENA), which called for an independent North Africa.  While this party went 
underground after its banning, it reemerged in 1933.  In 1934, the ENA became the National 
Union of North African Muslims, but it did not last long.  Its leader, Messali Ahmed Ben Hadj, 
was sentenced to one year in prison for reconstituting a banned party and then afterward went 
into self-imposed exile in Switzerland.  Nevertheless, in 1936, Ben Hadj reconstituted the ENA 
with the creation of the Algerian’s People Party (PPA). 
While the PPA mirrored the ENA, it differed from its predecessor.  The new ENA-PPA 
was confined solely to Algeria.  This party won the municipal elections and was the first to 
advance Algerian independence.  Another significant quasi-political entity was the Federation of 
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Elected Muslims.  The Federation of Elected Muslims was comprised of Muslim elites who 
represented Algerian Muslims in local elected bodies.  They joined with the ENA-PPA in 1936 
to form the Algerian Muslim Congress, which only lasted until 1937.  After which, there was a 
spilt that resulted in the creation of the Franco-Muslim Algerian Rally and the Popular Algerian 
Union.  Aside from these, other Algerian political and quasi-political collectivities that 
developed under colonization included the Popular Algerian Union, the Friends of the Manifesto 
and Liberty (AML), the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), Movement for 
the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD),2 and the Algerian Society of Reformist Ulema.3 
These political and quasi-political collectivities provided the foundation for the Algerian 
national sentiment, which was solidified during and after the 1954 Algerian Muslim Rebellion 
(Gillespie, 1960).  The trigger for this rebellion, which ultimately led to Algerian independence 
in 1962, was the success of violent resistance in Tunisia and the failure of past attempts by 
Algerians to work within the French framework and French political parties.4  The 1954 
rebellion was unique and unlike past attempts, because it was the first time Algerians united to 
fight the French.  This is, in part, what made the rebellion more successful than past attempts.  
Previous armed insurrections failed due to a lack of organization and a fragile unity among 
Algerian Muslims (Gillespie, 1960: 58).  It was also successful because the rebellion solidified 
the Algerian national identity that began to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s.  The identity was 
                                                            
2 The MTLD replaced the PPA in 1946 
. 
3 The Algerian Society of Reformist Ulema was established in 1931.  It was very influential despite the fact that it 
did not concern itself with politics.  All candidates, French and Algerian, sought the Ulema’s support before running 
for election. 
 
4 Paraphrasing Fanon (1967: 55), the violence of decolonization is instructive for others who aspire to the same goal.  
Moreover, the goal itself, decolonization, confers sovereignty that in turn engenders respect from others.  This was 
the mentality of the Algerian nationals that led the 1954 Rebellion, which was accepted by the overwhelming 
majority of Algerian Muslims, who had been colonized for more than 132 years. 
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further forged by mass poverty and repression, which provided concrete goals and means to the 
activists that mobilized to lead the rebellion (Burke III, 1998; Celik, 1996; Gillespie, 1960).  
Those activists mobilized to create the National Liberation Front. 
In conclusion, Algerian mobilization under French colonization demonstrated the 
importance of identity, crises, deprivation, conflict, structural differentiation and political 
opportunities for the attainment of Algerians political ends.  During colonization, Algerians were 
denied their identity and culture.  They experienced deprivation due to unequal socio-economic 
policies, which created crises among the disaffected.  Algerian Muslims were unable to 
challenge the French governance structure inside conventional political boundaries due to a lack 
of structural differentiation.  Political activists were prohibited from taking part in the system due 
to the domination of Colons, who feared Algerian Muslim secession.    Activists had to mobilize 
outside the conventional political boundaries.  This led to the creation of the FLN.  The military 
and political success of the FLN contributed to their dominance of the post-independence 
governance structure. It was because of the FLN’s dominance that contemporary movements 
such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have their roots in the Algerian nationalism forged 
under French colonization.  FIS, therefore, is very much a part of and operated within the 
Algerian nationalist framework. 
 
FIS Mobilization from the American Paradigm   
 
The conditions in Algeria were relatively similar to those under French colonization, 
which aided activists in the mobilization of the FLN.  The period prior to and at the time of the 
FIS mobilization was characterized by socio-economic crises, deprivation and transitional 
structural differentiation.  According to the American paradigm, crises, deprivation and level of 
structural differentiation do not cause mobilization.  Rather, they provide political opportunities 
 
  47
for activists to utilize.  For the American paradigm the role of the activists enables mobilizations.  
This section examines the enabling explanatory variables and the way activists utilize them to 
explain the mobilization of FIS. 
Socio-Economic Crises, Deprivation and Structural Differentiation.  Crises in the form of 
unstable socio-economic conditions were present when FIS mobilized (United Nations Human 
Development Index).  In particular, Algeria was “…plagued by over-population, inadequate 
housing, over-urbanization, unreliable food production and supplies, a decrepit transportation 
system, chronic water shortages, over-crowded schools, poor quality medical facilities and health 
services, uncontrollable birth rates, and high rates of unemployment and underemployment” 
(Entelis, 1992: 15-16).  These conditions were a product of socio-economic crises.  The crises 
were a result of the economic policies implemented in the 1980s.5  Specifically, it was severe 
cuts to many of the socio-welfare programs, consumer cooperatives, and transportation and 
housing subsidies (Alexander, 2002; Layachi, 2001).  These contributed to segments of the 
population becoming disaffected.  Initially, those most isolated were small businesses, low-level 
bureaucrats and administrators, the educated, and the middle-class (Layachi, 2001; Chhibber, 
1996).  It was not until the sharp decline in oil revenues throughout the 1980s that larger 
segments of the population became disaffected.  By 1988, crises and the government reduction in 
socio-welfare benefits to the lower socio-economic class resulted in widespread deprivation. 
According to the American paradigm, crises lead to deprivation (Yiftachel, 1997 and 
1992; Zureik, 1993; Haidar, 1991).  Deprivation was present prior to and at the time of the FIS 
mobilization.  In particular, it was present from 1975 to 1989 (UNDP Human Poverty Index).  
Christian Alexander (2002) found that social, political and economic deprivation in particular 
                                                            
5 See Layachi (2001) and Chhibber (1996) for more detail on the economic conditions and policies during the period 
of 1970 to 1991.  
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characterized the period between the 1970s to the 1990s.  Socially, there was widespread 
dissatisfaction when the government cut social expenditures, which Algerians viewed as their 
right as citizens.  Political dissatisfaction was due to the domination of one-party rule, with the 
people voting for the candidates selected for them by the ruling party;6 the prohibition against 
freedom of expression;7  and, the prohibition in the formation of political collectivities.  
Economically, deprivation was a product of an economic downturn in Algeria due to declining 
oil prices and rising debt (Layachi, 2001). 
Crises and deprivation extending to widespread segments of the population resulted in the 
October 1988 protests.  These protests brought the young and old, the educated and uneducated, 
and the employed and unemployed together to express their dissatisfaction with the existing 
status quo.  Protest outside of conventional political boundaries was a product of Algerians being 
unable to challenge government policies due to a lack of structural differentiation (Alexander, 
2002; Layachi, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2001; Tahi, 1995; Roberts, 1995; Entelis, 
1992). 
According to the American paradigm, structural differentiation is important because it 
determines whether activists have access to the government to redress the causes of deprivation.  
From the time of independence in 1962 and until the passage of the 1989 Constitution, the 
Algerian government was not structurally differentiated (Entelis, 1992 and 1980).  Rather, it was 
politically dominated by the FLN.  When the government was established in 1962, all opposition 
parties were either banned or placed under the firm control of the party.  The first Algerian 
President, Ben Bella, codified prohibition against political parties. 
                                                            
6 To be eligible as a candidate an individual had to be a member of FLN. 
 
7 The government controlled the media and often used repression for any form of public displays of discontent. 
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Ben Bella was replaced in 1965 in a bloodless coup led by Boumedienne, who remained 
in office until his death in December 1978.  From January 1979 and until he was forcibly 
removed by the military in 1989, the Algerian government was headed by Benjedid, who was 
appointed by the military.  Similar to the political conditions under Ben Bella’s tenure, political 
parties and public displays of discontent were prohibited from taking place outside the Party.  
This meant that opposition could only take place inside the FLN or through one of the six legal 
organizations authorized and headed by members of the FLN.8    Consequently, all institutions 
were subjected to manipulation by the governing authority.  The government did not interfere so 
long as they operated within the governing structure and did not conflict with the governance of 
FLN.  If they conflicted, then they were replaced, banned or shut down (Entelis, 1992 and 1980). 
The FLN is comprised of multiple factions or collectivities, with three main 
constituencies—the party, the government, and the military.  The main constituent part of the 
FLN is the party, which is headed by colonels and the heads of military regions throughout 
Algeria.  The party did not take-on a separate political identity until 1991, when it refused to 
support a military coup to overturn FIS’ majority win in the elections.  Prior to 1991, the party 
was dominated by military, with its officials holding the majority of the governmental positions 
(Tahi, 1995). 
The military collectivity is comprised of the Army and the Securite Militaire (SM).  The 
Army was the dominant constituent part of FLN since its creation in the 1950s.  Its dominance in 
the governance structure did not occur until 1963, when Boumedienne led a bloodless coup 
                                                            
8 These six legal institutions included a workers union (UGTA), a famers union (UNPA), a youth association 
(UNSA), an organization comprised of former mujahidin—freedom fighters from the War of Independence—
(ONM), a women’s association (UNFA), and a student union (UNEA).  The latter, however, was disbanded in the 
1970s due to it attempting to challenge the centralized authority of the government.  Political parties and the 
formation of quasi-political collectivities were not permitted until the passage of the 1989 Constitution, which 
legalized freedom of expression and the creation of political parties. 
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against Ben Bella and installed the Council of Revolution.  It was from then on that the Army 
directly controlled all positions of authority by selecting candidates and appointing government 
officials (Tahi, 1995; Entelis, 1980).  The Securite Militaire (SM) was created in 1965 by 
Boumedienne to counter-balance the Army.  The SM’s main function was to sow chaos and 
discord within areas and collectivities that had the potential to threaten the government and 
FLN’s political dominance.  For example, it established the organizations of FFS2 and RCD in 
an attempt to thwart the popularity of FFS.  It established the Coordination National of the 
Mouvment Cultural Berbere (MCB) in an attempt to thwart the Berber Cultural Movement 
(BCM).  Finally, it established the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Hamas and Enhada to thwart 
FIS.  While it was supposed to be officially dissolved in 1989, it continued to operate 
clandestinely.  (Tahi, 1995).  The three FLN constituencies were united by one common 
ideological foundation (Tahi, 1995; Entelis, 1992 and 1980), which was Arab-Muslim 
nationalism9 (International Crisis Group, 2004; Knauss, 1987).  Islam was defined as the 
foundation of the identity of Algeria.10  The role of the state was to provide material benefits and 
to promote Islamic principles and morality (International Crisis Group, 2004 and 2003; 
Marrouchi, 2003; Layachi, 2001; Monshipouri, 1998; Zoubir, 1996; Tahi, 1995). 
In conclusion, the lack of structural differentiation prior to 1989 resulted in protests 
occurring outside conventional political boundaries.  These protests did not occur though until 
crises caused widespread deprivation among all segments of the population, which was not until 
1988.  When these protest erupted the government used repression to suppress all segments of 
                                                            
9 Arab-Muslim nationalism in Algeria combined the ideas of pan-Arabism with pan-Islamism. 
 




society.  Repressionary practices include, but are not limited to, discriminatory policies11 and 
human rights abuses such as violence and imprisonment.12  In 1988, the Political Terror Scale13 
indicated the government’s use of repression such as murder, disappearance, and torture as 
widespread.  While there was not elite opposition to the use of repression, widespread 
dissatisfaction did result in there being a change in elite receptivity (International Crisis Group, 
2004 and 2003; Alexander, 2002; Tahi, 1999; Entelis, 1992 and 1980; Knauss, 1987).  The 
change in elite receptivity led to the passage of the 1989 Constitution.  The constitution 
authorized the creation of political parties and freedom of expression, which marked the 
transition from less to greater structural differentiation.  It was in this period that the activists, 
who led the 1988 protest, began to mobilize to create the FIS.  The American paradigm posited 
that structural differentiation and socio-economic crises, which caused deprivation, provide 
activists with political opportuneities. 
Political Opportunities.  The activists that created the FIS utilized political opportunities 
provided by less structural differentiation, lack of access to governance structures, and lack of 
ability for political parties or quasi-political collectivities to form, participate and challenge the 
                                                            
11 Discriminatory policies included prohibition on the right to express dissent (Alexander 2002) and the formation of 
political collectivities, as already discussed.   
 
12 Human rights abuses such as violence and imprisonment occurred against those who expressed political dissent 
within the public sphere, but they were not widespread (Entelis 1980 and 1992).   
 
13 Level one characterized countries that are secure rule of law, where people are not imprisoned for their view, and 
the use of torture or political murder is rare or exceptional.  Level two characterized countries that have a limited 
amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but where few persons are affected and torture, beatings, 
and political murder are rare or exceptional.  Level three characterized countries that have extensive political 
imprisonment or a recent history of such imprisonment, where execution or other political murders and brutality are 
common, and where unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.  Level four 
characterized countries where civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population, 
wherein the use of murder, disappearance, and torture are a common part of life and affects those who interest 
themselves in politics or ideas.  Level five, the extreme, characterized countries that use terror overall the 
population, wherein leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 




governance structure.  The creation of the FIS, according to Ahmed Semozrag, head of the 
Department of Human Rights of the FIS, was to restore Algerian sovereignty by ending the 
military dictatorship of the FLN and its corruption (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003: 73).  The FIS 
thereby signified its rejection of the status quo that had been plagued with corruption and 
authoritarianism since 1962.14  Rejection of the status quo resonated particularly with those born 
post-independence, who were most affected by the unstable socio-economic conditions.  The 
FIS, thus, presented itself as representing the masses.  In fact, one of its leaders, Ben Hadj, led 
the 1988 protesters.  Its separation from the status quo was reified that encompassed cultural, 
educational, socio-economic and political policies. 
FIS cultural policies stem from the belief that the evils plaguing western societies such as 
AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, degradation of morality, crime, and corruption need to be 
combated (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Islamic Salvation Front,  2003).   Culturally, its 
platform sought to unite the Islamist trends of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafiyya 
traditions.15  FIS provision of socio-cultural and socio-economic benefits to society, however, 
resulted in its cultural policy being strategically linked to the rest of society.  In particular, the 
FIS provided the working class neighborhoods with effective local policing, affordable markets, 
and a de facto welfare system.16  Development of social welfare programs, separate from 
                                                            
14 In fact, the discourse used by FIS to refer to the FLN was “les voluers du FLN,” the thieves of the FLN, and 
“l’etat impie,” the impious state (International Crisis Group, 2004).  
 
15 The ideological trends are discussed under the European paradigm. 
 
16 Its social infrastructure was built on the existing Islamist infrastructure developed over the years prior to Algeria’s 
independence to the present. Even after its outlawing, FIS continued to collect taxes from urban quarters and rural 
areas under their control. This enabled it to continue providing socio-welfare benefits to society (Rudolph and Van 




government institutions, established a support base within the rural and urban areas, provided a 
constituency for mobilization, and gave credibility to the FIS claim it could govern. 
Educational policy, according to the FIS, is the foundation for development.  
Consequently, all people should be taught rationalism, logic, ethics, history, sciences, and the 
broad principles of Islam without differences (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003). Consequently, the 
FIS supported an increase in budgets and extension of school year (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 
2008; Layachi, 2001).  Its emphasis on education resonated with the Islamist bloc, represented 
by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyya traditions, and the urban-rural youth, who had 
protested throughout the 1980s for educational reform.  Consequently, the FIS was able to draw 
from this constituency for mobilization. 
Economically, the FIS program deviated from the government’s planned economic and 
interventionist policy by providing an alternative based on capitalist principles of trade, industry 
and agriculture, and the development of entrepreneurial and private initiatives as sources of 
wealth (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Layachi, 2001).17  This resonated with the middle and 
business classes in both urban and rural areas.  By providing an alternative that addressed both 
middle and lower socio-economic sectors, the FIS was able to build a coalition composed of all 
segments of society for its mobilization. 
Politically, the FIS platform was premised on its participation and negotiation with all 
political entities in Algerian society (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003).  Rooted in the principle that 
a party voted into power may be voted out and derived from the principle of consultation and 
                                                            
17 It argued that FLN’s planned economy was the source of oppression that retarded and discouraged private 
initiative and, instead, advocated less state intervention, protection from foreign intervention, privatization and 
reform of nationalized properties, and support for small and medium businesses.  In the commercial sphere, it 





acceptance of all within society, the platform was significant because it attempted to unite all 
behind its mobilization.  The notion of participation resonated with those prohibited from 
publicly participating in the political system due to one-party rule since 1962.  The FIS platform 
also indicated an end to less structural differentiation in that it advocated the acceptance of all, 
irrespective of language and culture.  The purpose of this was three-fold.  First, it specifically 
directed attention to the FLN’s lack of acceptance of the Berber language and culture.  Second, it 
directed attention to the FLN’s unwillingness to except any ideology that conflicted with its own.  
Finally, it sought to alleviate fears among the secular and socialist trends that feared the 
implementation of a purely religious platform. 
The FIS platform, therefore, sought to promote unity and solidarity among those it 
represented within its own network and with society-at-large.  Anything contrary to unity and 
solidarity, the FIS argued, was opposite to its ideology (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003).  By 
doing so, it attempted to attack the FLN ideologically, as they represented the status quo.  The 
FIS also attempted to galvanize the political divisions within the FLN, particularly those between 
the party and the military.  In so doing, it was able to change elite receptivity and harness support 
within the political elite of the FLN.  Finally, the use of non-violent resistance for mobilization 
distinguished the FIS from the military.  It did so in the sense that the military violently repressed 
Algerians in October 1988, which was fresh in their institutional memory. 
In summary, the FIS utilized all the political opportunities provided except for the 
government’s use of repression.  In particular, it used the opportunities provided by crises, 
deprivation, structural differentiation, lack of access to and the absence of autonomous political 
institutions, and lack of access to and the inadequate government provision of resources.  
Consequently, the FIS case confirms the American paradigm’s proposition that movements 
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utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  It also confirms the proposition that the political 
opportunities were utilized to create linkages between individuals, institutions and organizations, 
which blur the line between movements and conventional political parties.  For the FIS, the 
blurring of the line produced changes in elite receptivity, which confirmed the paradigm’s 
proposition.  Finally, the American paradigm posited that political opportunities and structural 
differentiation define the choice of action. 
Choice of Action.  Whether action takes place inside or outside conventional boundaries, 
according to the American paradigm, depends on greater or less openness/access (structural 
differentiation) and political opportunities (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1992; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 
1973).  In the case of the FIS, there was a transition from less to greater structural differentiation 
underway and political opportunities at the time of its mobilization.  The mobilization of the FIS, 
prior to the creation of its organizational structure, occurred outside conventional boundaries.  
That is, the government had banned all public displays of protest, which meant that any 
occurrences were illegal and those who engaged therein were subjected to repressionary tactics.  
Despite prohibition, all segments of society turned out in droves to protest the unstable socio-
economic conditions and lack of freedom of expression and political participation.  Those who 
created the FIS in 1989 led the protesters.  This case demonstrates that transitional structural 
differentiation and political opportunities explain participation outside conventional political 
boundaries, which confirms the paradigm’s proposition. 
Mobilization from the European Paradigm 
Under French colonization, there were conflicts that exacerbated existing social 
cleavages.  The cleavages created a shared identity among the FLN activists that mobilized to 
affect relations of political domination.  The mobilization of the FIS was made possible by the 
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creation of a shared identity among activists.  For the European paradigm, it is the creation of a 
shared identity that produces mobilization and not activists' use of political opportunities.  
Therefore, this section examines the role of identity in the FIS mobilization. 
Conflict and Cleavages.  The European paradigm posited that the presence of conflict 
exacerbated existing social cleavages.  Armed conflict, in contrast to the other cases in this study, 
was not present when the FIS mobilized (Uppsala Conflict Dataset).18  Therefore, conflict did 
not exacerbate social cleavages and thus produce a shared identity among the activists that 
formed the FIS. Its lack of presence does weaken the argument of the generality of the 
paradigm’s proposition.  The proposition may need to posit conflict or crises.  Crises, as will be 
demonstrated, did exacerbate existing cleavages, which thus provided a shared identity among 
activists. 
Socio-economic crises made salient ethno-religious, gender, geographical, generational 
and class-based cleavages.  Existing ethnic cleavages were united by a shared Muslim identity 
(Silverstein, 2002; Layachi, 2001; Tahi, 1995; Roberts, 1995).19  As previously mentioned, the 
FLN defined Islam as the foundation of the social identity of Algeria and the role of the state 
being the provision of material benefits and the promotion of Islamic principles and morality 
though the creation of religious institutions (International Crisis Group, 2004 and 2003; 
Marrouchi, 2003; Layachi, 2001; Monshipouri, 1998; Zoubir, 1996; Tahi, 1995).  The Muslim 
identity was further reified by anti-colonial nationalism that emerged under French colonization 
(International Crisis Group, 2004 and 2003; Marrouchi, 2003; Layachi, 2001; Monshipouri, 
1998; Zoubir, 1996; Tahi, 1995).  A cleavage in the Muslim or ethno-religious identity, 
                                                            
18 See chapter two for the definition of conflict used by the Uppsala Database. 
 
19 Berbers only constitute twenty percent of the Algerian population.  Although the government refuses to recognize 
their distinct culture and language, Berbers do identify with and feel a belonging to Algerian society (Knauss, 1987). 
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immediately prior to and at the time of the FIS mobilization, was made salient by unstable socio-
economic conditions.  In particular, the government's reduction of socio-economic welfare 
benefits (Layachi, 2001; Chhibber, 1996). 
Gender cleavages have always been salient due to the patriarchal nature of Algerian 
society, which was even the case under French colonization (Amrane-Minne, 1999).  Under 
French colonization, the military and colon administrations repressed and prohibited the public 
participation of women.  After independence, under the FLN, the status of women did not 
improve despite the active role they played in the 1954 Rebellion.  The FLN accepted their role 
on the battlefield, but continued to exclude them from public participation.  Gender identities, 
while always having been salient, were made more so by the suppression (Amrane-Minne, 1999) 
and unstable socio-economic conditions due to unemployment and underemployment (Layachi, 
2001). 
Like gender, geographical or urban-rural based cleavages were present prior to, during 
and after French colonization (Knauss, 1987).  At the time when the FIS mobilized, these 
cleavages were made salient due to under-development and lack of resources (Silverstein, 2002; 
Layachi, 2001; Knauss, 1987).  Urban areas had better access to resources that aided in their 
development in contrast to rural areas (Silverstein, 2002).  Within both the urban and rural areas, 
cleavages were made salient by the unstable socio-economic conditions.  Within the urban areas, 
cleavages existed between the economic elite and those of lower socio-economic classes.20  
Within the rural areas, cleavages existed between those who owned land versus those who 
worked the land (Knauss, 1987).  Geographical or urban-rural based cleavages were exacerbated 
                                                            
20 For example, in May of 1983, 100,000 Algerians, many among the poorest of Algiers 2.5 million inhabitants, 
lived crammed together in the 1,700 buildings of Casaba.  In those dwellings, which are owned by property owners 




by the unstable socio-economic conditions and generational cleavages (Silverstein, 2002; 
Layachi, 2001; Knauss, 1987). 
Generational cleavages were present in Algerian society among Algerians raised in the 
pre-independence period versus those raised in the post-independence period (Silverstein, 2002; 
Layachi, 2001; Tahi, 1995; Roberts, 1995; Entelis, 1992; Knauss, 1987).  The younger 
generation, in particular, lacked the institutional memory of those living under colonization and 
were more concerned with securing a job, finding decent housing, and continuing their education 
(Knauss, 1987).  The post-independence generation was plagued by unemployment and 
underemployment, high government deficits in state-run industries, and rampant corruption 
(Layachi, 2001; Knauss, 1987).  Therefore, generational cleavages were exacerbated by the 
unstable socio-economic conditions. 
Like the other cleavages, generational cleavages were made further salient by class-based 
cleavages (Layachi and Haireche, 2001; Bensmaia, 1997; Chhibber, 1996; Tahi, 1995; Entelis, 
1992).  Specific class-based division include the educated versus non-educated; employed versus 
the unemployed (Tahi, 1995) and the educated employed versus the educated non-employed; 
middle-class versus lower socio-economic class (Chhibber, 1996); and, finally, intellectual elites 
versus professional elites (Bensmaia, 1997).  These cleavages were also exacerbated by the 
unstable socio-economic conditions. 
In conclusion, social crises exacerbated social cleavages, which created shared identities 
among the activists that created the FIS.  The European paradigm did not provide propositions 
regarding the type of cleavages made salient.  The FIS identified ethno-religious, gender, 
geographical, generational and class-based cleavages.  According to the paradigm, these 
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cleavages should have created a shared identity among the activists that mobilized to create the 
FIS. 
FIS Identity.  For the paradigm, the shared identity among the FIS activists should 
overcome existing cleavages to promote unity.  In Algeria, the rise of political Islam is rooted in 
French colonization.  Two ideological variants, the Salafiyya tradition and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, represented political Islam under colonization and operated within, but separate 
from, the FLN.21  The Salafiyya tradition was comprised of two trends—the official leaders 
appointed by the FLN, who were veterans of the Association des Oulemas Musulmans Algerians 
(AOMA); and, the dissident AOMA veterans, who operated outside official Islam and attacked 
the moral decay of society and government corruption (Knauss, 1987).  The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Algeria emerged in the 1960s and was also comprised of two trends—an 
international variant that was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; and, a local 
variant that was influenced by the former yet independent (Knauss, 1987).22   The FIS members 
were made up of the dissident AOMA members and the local trend of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
with the latter being dominant. 
The FIS, according to one of its leaders Ali Ben Hadj, is a network comprising a 
multitude of Islamic associations for educating, raising the consciousness of the people, and 
engaging in politics (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003: xxii).  In fact, quoting Ibn Khaldun, he said, 
“[p]olitics is a competition for the public good, not private property.  It is one of many aspects of 
                                                            
21 Outside of these two traditions but shaped by them, the Armed Islamic Unit (AIU) was created in the 1980s by 
disgruntled members of ALN and FFS, both of which were members within the FLN network.  While AIU initially 
challenged the FLN politically from within, it officially joined the FLN network in 1987 (International Crisis Group, 
2004). 
 
22 From the 1960s to 1981, the Brotherhood existed as a social welfare organization that provided welfare, 
education, health and economic services and implemented programs to distribute clothes and water.  The 
Brotherhood did not begin taking on a more political role until 1981, which was limited to lobbying government 




collective worship of God that brings great benefits” (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003: xxiv).  
Consequently, the FIS, founded in March 1989, was legalized as a political party in September of 
that same year.  In June 1990, the FIS won a majority in the communal and regional assemblies.  
It was also predicted to win the majority in the second round of parliamentary elections before 
they were cancelled by the military. 
The roots of the FIS extend back to the period of French colonization, according to 
Mostafa Brahimi, a member of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front, 2003).  In fact, the FIS leader, 
Sheikh Abassi Madani, participated in both the 1945 and 1954 rebellions.  Even the members too 
young to participate in the rebellion were also affected.  For example, Ali Ben Hadj,23 another 
top leader, was the son of an influential Mujahid in the National Liberation Army of the FLN and 
a student of other the FIS leaders that fought in the rebellion.  Consequently, the discourse and 
identity of the FIS were nationalistic in nature.  Since it was rooted in the period of French 
colonization, the discourse and platform of the FIS were also nationalistic.  The use of nationalist 
themes thus resonated with those who grew up during the war of liberation and their children 
(International Crisis Group, 2004).24  The movement specifically referred to itself as being the 
son of the true FLN, referring to the FLN of the 1954 to 1962 period, which many of its 
members were part of at that time (Addi, 1994: 5). 
In summary, the FIS utilized the existing cleavages that were exacerbated by socio-
economic crises to create a shared identity.  While the paradigm does not posit the types of 
cleavages that activists utilize, the FIS case suggests that ethno-religious, gender, generation, 
                                                            
23  Ben Hadj had a large following among the urban youth.  He was arrested and charged with violating the security 
of the state in 1983.  He was not released until December 1987.  During the 1988 demonstrations, he led the people 
calling for peaceful demonstrations and for the right of the people to choose their destiny.   
 




geographic and class-based cleavages provide a shared identity.  For the FIS, ideology also 
played a role in the creation of a shared identity among movement activists.  In particular, it was 
able to create an ideological niche by discursively linking itself to the 1954 Rebellion and the 
historical FLN of the 1954 to 1962 period.  This resulted in creating ideological linkages to elites 
within the FLN.  Its platform and policies, discussed in the American paradigm section, also 
linked the FIS ideologically to all of the existing social cleavages.  Moreover, its membership 
was composed of all segments of society, including male, female, all socio-economic classes, 
and from all geographical areas.  All of these factors created a shared identity among FIS 
activists and their constituency.  Shared identities, according to the paradigm, produce 
mobilization to effect relations of domination. 
Domination.  The types present included bureaucratic domination, which had its roots in 
the petty bourgeoisie class created under French colonization (Brett 1994); political domination 
of one-party rule, which was also referred to in the literature on Algeria as authoritarian 
domination (Alexander 2002); and, finally, military domination (International Crisis Group 
2000).  These types of subordination provided a link or shared sense of solidarity among the 
existing social identities in Algeria.  The FIS, based on its political platform, was created for 
addressing all three types of domination.  In particular, the FIS was created to restore Algerian 
sovereignty by ending the military dictatorship and government corruption (Islamic Salvation 
Front, 2003: 73).  The FIS case confirms the paradigm’s proposition that mobilization is to effect 
relations of domination. 
Choice of Action.  The paradigm posited that the relations of actors to the environment 
and their goals determine the possibilities and the limits of action.  The FIS defined itself as a 
political opposition party and not a resistance movement.  It neither rejected the Algerian state 
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nor called for the overthrow of the existing governance system or dominant political party.  
Instead, the FIS called for freedom of expression and equal access to and representation in the 
existing political system. Consequently, its goals were an end to political domination and 
restoration of Algerian sovereignty.  Given this, violent protest would not have been an option.  
The majority of the FIS was comprised of activists from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, 
which rejected violence as a form of protest.  This helps to explain the form of non-violent 
protest adopted by the activists in the October 1988 protests.  Even the minority, represented by 
the AOMA tradition, never advocated the use of violent protest.  Activists from both traditions 
had operated within the FLN party system prior to 1988.  The state’s emphasis on the Muslim 
identity helps to explain their legal participation inside conventional politics.  Finally, the 
opening of the Algerian governance system to reflect structural differentiation made participation 
in the form of conventional politics possible. 
In summary, the paradigm predicted that existing conflict exacerbated social cleavages to 
create a shared identity.  The examination of the FIS demonstrated that crises exacerbated 
existing social cleavages to create a shared identity among activists.  From these cleavages, the 
FIS was able to develop a shared identity among not only activists but also its constituency.  
These activists mobilized to create the FIS for effecting relations of political domination.  The 
creation of a shared identity was thus necessary for FIS mobilization. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the mobilization of the FIS from within the American and 
European paradigms.  These paradigms are theoretical frameworks that exist within the social 
movement literature to explain movement mobilizations, each positing very different explanatory 
variables.  The American paradigm posited that the existence of socio-economic crises, 
 
  63
deprivation and less structural differentiation in Algerian society provided political opportunities 
for the FIS to use, which enabled its mobilization.  The European paradigm, on the other hand, 
posited that the existence of conflict would exacerbate social cleavages within Algerian society 
to create shared identities among FIS activists, which would enable the movement’s 
mobilization.  As already discussed, conflict was not present but socio-economic crises were, 
which had the same affect as the variable posited by the paradigm.  This suggests that crises and 
conflict in the European paradigm have a similar affect on mobilization. 
 Given that both paradigms provided explanations for the FIS mobilization, an argument can be 
made for the generality of the paradigms.  An argument can also be made for an integrated approach.  The 
FIS would not have been able to mobilize without shared identities among its activists and those identities 
being rooted within existing social cleavages.  Moreover, its mobilization would not have been possible 
without the political opportunities that were provided by the existence of socio-economic crises, 





Mobilizing the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine 
 
This chapter examines the cases the Islamic Jihad Movement and the Hamas.  The 
Islamic Jihad mobilized in 1980.  Hamas mobilized at the time of the Intifada in 1987.  Both 
movements are rooted in and shaped by the historical development of a Palestinian national 
consciousness, as the first section demonstrates.  Understanding the development of national 
consciousness is necessary to understand the mobilization of Islamic Jihad and the Hamas. 
 
  Brief History of Palestinian National Consciousness 
 After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine came under the control of the British.  
During the mandate period, the British had simultaneously promised the Arabs and Jews the 
creation of a state in the same territories due to their help fighting the Turks.25  This 
simultaneous promise fueled the armed resistance that broke out between the Arabs and Jews.  
The British turned the Palestinian issue over to the United Nations in 1947.  The UN approved 
the partitioning of the territory into two states, one for Arabs and one for Jews.  The leaders of 
the Arab governments rejected this and Israel declared independence, which resulted in the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war. 
 Israel’s victory resulted in it capturing a significant portion of the territory.  The 1948 war 
and Israel’s victory was significant because it resulted in the mass exodus of Palestinians from 
their homes.  The mass exodus of Palestinians is significant for understanding the development 
of Palestinian consciousness for two reasons.  First, the mass exodus of Palestinians helps us to 
understand why many of the movements that formed in the 1950s and 1960s were created 
                                                            
25 See Khalidi (1997) for a more detailed history of this period. 
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outside rather than inside the territories.  Relatedly, the development of movements outside the 
territories prevented the formation of a unified Palestinian front between Palestinians living 
inside and outside the territories.  This helps explain why it took so long for a Palestinian 
national consciousness to develop. 
   To understand the development of a Palestinian national consciousness, Lisa Taraki 
(1990) posits that it is necessary to go back two decades before the Intifada in 1987.  A 
Palestinian consciousness is the idea that the establishment of a Palestinian national authority by 
itself can fulfill national aspirations.  Palestinian consciousness, Taraki argued, was the product 
of the convergence of many factors and events including: the ambivalent position of Arab 
governments, the rise of Palestinian resistance in the 1960s, the growth of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), and, most importantly, the conditions of daily life under Israeli 
military occupation beginning in 1967 (Taraki 1990: 53). 
Prior to 1967, the Palestinian cause and identity were not articulated in distinctly 
Palestinian organizations.  They were articulated in terms of Arabism, which, according to 
Rashid Khalidi, is the belief in the notion that “Arabs were a single people with a single 
language, history, and culture, divided not by centuries of separate development of widely 
separated countries, but by the recent machinations of imperialism” (Khalidi, 1997:  131-133).  
The pan-Arab nature of the Palestinian identity provided a larger sense of identity, which gave 
the perception of a promise of protection from external, or at least regional, pressures (Farsoun 
and Zacharia 1997).  The failure of pan-Arabism, however, is what turned the Palestinian 
identity inward to emphasize its Palestinan-ness and toward nationalistic groups (Taraki, 1990). 
Not only did the failure of pan-Arabism aid in turning Palestinian identity inward, but so 
too did the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961 and the independence of Algeria in 
 
  66
1962 (Nassar and Heacock, 1990).  The success of the Algerian Muslim Rebellion was 
significant because it influenced Fatah’s armed struggle from 1964-1965 and the Uprising of 
1966, which in turned influenced the separation of Palestinian identification from a larger Arab 
identity, and from Arab governments, Jordan’s in particular.  Finally, the Arab-Israeli war of 
1967 solidified a distinct Palestinian identity and reconciled divisions between Palestinians 
inside and outside the territories. 
Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian 
territories led to armed resistance and the start of Palestinian political mobilization (Taraki, 1990: 
55).  Mobilization outside the territories, led by Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, sought to create a popular revolutionary movement that would unite Palestinians living 
inside and outside of the territories.  Given their location outside of the territories, they were 
unable to mobilize Palestinians living in the West Bank.  Gaza, however, was a different story.  
Palestinians living in Gaza had been trained by the Egyptian military (Farsoun and Zacahria, 
1997), which created conditions that led to both violent and non-violent protest against Israeli 
forces in Gaza from 1967-71.  By 1971, Israel had defeated Palestinian resistance in Gaza, and 
Jordan had suppressed resistance led from its territories. 
 However, in retrospect we see that the quashing of Palestinian resistance by both Israel 
and Jordan was important to the development of Palestinian national consciousness. The 
increasing presence of Israelis living inside the occupied territories heightened Palestinian 
identity.  For the first time Palestinians spoke out for the creation of an independent, sovereign 
entity to call home.  Previously, Palestinian resistance movements called for a return to the status 
quo—those in the West Bank had previously called for a return to Jordan, whereas those in Gaza 
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had called for a return to Egypt.  The call for an independent state came with the creation of the 
PNF (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; Taraki, 1990). 
The creation of the PNF, therefore, was the culmination of a Palestinian national 
consciousness.  Moreover, the PNF was able to unite Palestinians inside and outside the 
territories behind a campaign of civil disobedience. It aided in the development of a distinct 
Palestinian civil society to foster self-reliance.  The PNF was more successful than past attempts 
at mobilization due to its coordination of those both inside and outside the territories. Its youth 
programs such as the Voluntary Worker Movement were also important in this effort.  The 
Voluntary Worker Movement was significant for several reasons.  First, it was the only 
substantial community effort to bring both young men and women together. Secondly, it was the 
first time an organization overcame the barrier between many societal cleavages, namely 
divisions between the intellectual and working classes, the urban and rural areas, and the middle 
and lower socio-economic classes. Finally, it served as the springboard for other cultural 
programs.  The movement was able to operate unhindered by the occupying authorities due to its 
apolitical nature.  It was not until 1976 that the Israelis began to crackdown on its operation, 
when the movement mobilized Palestinians for the municipal elections held in the West Bank 
(Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; Taraki, 1990). 
      Despite the crackdown by the Israeli military authorities, the institutional framework 
established during the early 1970s assisted in the building of a non-clandestine national 
movement in the late 1970s.  This period saw the creation of open frameworks for political, 
social and cultural action; the amplification of mass participation; and, the incorporation of new 
social forces, particularly in the lower socio-economic classes, into Palestinian institutional life 
(Taraki, 1990: 60).  The mass organizations created during this period were designed to 
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incorporate and mobilize large numbers of Palestinians from all lifestyles and occupations in a 
decentralized structure that permitted democratic decision-making (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; 
Taraki, 1990).  These mass organizations were responsible for creating national institutions to be 
subsumed under an eventual Palestinian state (Taraki 1990: 66).  The development of national 
institutions created a dual infrastructure within the Palestinian territories, one under the control 
of the occupying authorities, and the other controlled by Palestinians (Farsoun and Zacharia, 
1997).  While the dual infrastructure created by Palestinians inside the territories existed, a quasi-
governmental infrastructure would not be established until the 1990s.  This was due to the fact 
that from 1967 until the 1990s, the territories were not autonomous; they were governed by the 
Israel military. 
   The creation of a dual institutional infrastructure, however, resulted in the consolidation 
of the Palestinian national movement and the expansion of its social base in the 1980s (Farsoun 
and Zacharia 1997; Taraki 1990).  It was also in this period that the Islamic movement began to 
develop its national identity which was separate from that of the national movement that  had 
developed over the years (Taraki, 1990: 67).  The Islamic movement, which was comprised of 
multiple identities but dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza,26 had 
been active in Palestinian society since the early 1930s.  Until the 1980s, it was limited to 
religio-cultural and social issues.  The Islamist movement influenced Palestinians inside the 
territories because it provided financial support and social services to large segments of the 
                                                            
26 The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza was separate from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt created 
by Hasan al-Bana.  While independent thereof, it was connected to the Egyptian Brotherhood.  Being a member of 
the Brotherhood entails the prohibition against violent resistance, which is why a separate organization, Hamas, was 
created in 1987.  Consequently, Hamas has its origins in the Brotherhood, but it separate from the organization.  Its 
adoption of violence resistance meant that it could no longer be an organization within the Brotherhood network.   




disaffected population.  Moreover, due to the Brotherhood’s apolitical nature27 from the 1930s to 
1987, it operated almost unhindered by the military authority. 
Even in the 1980s, the Islamic movement was not interested in creating and gaining 
control of organizations and institutions; it was not concerned with political power.28  Its main 
ambition was the formation of Islamic blocs at universities, youth associations and charitable 
societies (Taraki, 1990: 67).  While the Brotherhood remained apolitical, it was a different story 
for members of the Islamist bloc in  Gaza. It was in Gaza at the Islamic Center and Islamic 
University that dissemination of an Islamic political thinking was the intent.  Consequently, it 
was in Gaza that Islamic organizations separate from the Brotherhood developed, namely the 
Islamic Jihad movement. 
The development of a Palestinian national consciousness is reflected in the various 
movements that developed over the years.  Palestinian representation was spread among a 
diverse set of groups:  the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement (PRM), the Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian 
Communist Party (PCP), which later became the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP).  With the 
exception of the PRM, all of these movements developed outside the Palestinian territories.  In 
this way they were significantly different from the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which developed 
inside Palestinian territories and refused to join the PLO (Abu Amr, 1994). 
Fatah and the PFLP developed in the 1950s.  Fatah was created as an armed resistance 
movement, with no political ideology outside of the liberation of Palestine.  Unlike the PFLP, 
                                                            
27 See Abu Amr (1994), El Awaisi (1998), and Mishal and Sela (2006) for the apolitical nature of the Brotherhood in 
Palestine.  
 
28 Again see Abu Amr (1994), El Awaisi (1998) and Mishal and Sela (2006) regarding the claim that the Islamic 
movement was not interested in creating and gaining control of organizations and institutions or in gaining power. 
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Fatah was not a grass-roots resistance movement that worked from the bottom-up.  Instead, it 
was hierarchical and worked primarily with Arab governments and institutions.  Unlike Fatah, 
the PFLP was an underground-armed resistance movement and political organization that called 
for revolution in the entire Arab world.  In contrast to Fatah, the PFLP was much smaller in 
actual numbers but carried greater influence among Palestinians due to its underground political 
organization.  The PFLP was initially a pan-Arab party that transformed itself into a Marxist-
Leninist party in 1967.  This ideological transformation resulted in the fragmentation of the 
group and resulted in the creation of DFLP. The DFLP, founded in 1969, is more orthodox-
Marxist and calls for the creation of a non-sectarian, secular state, where all citizens are equal.    
Despite ideological fragmentation, these groups worked at the grassroots level in the refugee 
camps outside of the territories in an attempt to build bridges with other Palestinian opposition 
parties and movements.  When Fatah and the PFLP joined the PLO in 1968, they became its two 
largest parties. 
The PLO was created in 1964 by the Arab governments and Palestinians living outside 
the occupied territories.  At its creation, it was comprised of the Palestinian National Council 
(PNC), which was the executive arm, and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), which was the 
main armed wing.29  From its creation until 1993, the PLO had no physical presence in the 
Palestinian territories.30  The PLO, however, was the first Palestinian movement to call for an 
independent Palestine, mandatory conscription, and freedom of political action.  Consequently, it 
influenced the resistance movements that emerged inside the territories in the 1980s. 
                                                            
29 It is interesting to note here that former members of the PLA comprise a large segment of the Islamic Jihad.  See 
the section on PIJ Identity for more information.     
 




The largest movements to develop during the period in which Palestinian consciousness 
was developing were the Palestinian Arab National Union (PANU) and the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement (PRM).  Created in Gaza in 1964, PANU was an above-ground political 
resistance movement affiliated with the PLO.  Its purpose was to issue leaflets in an attempt to 
garner support for the PLO among Palestinians living in the territories.  PANU did not last long 
due to repressive Israeli military policies.  The PRM also emerged in 1964 as an underground 
movement located in Gaza.  Its purpose was armed resistance against Israel.  The PRM merged 
with the PLO in 1968, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.  This merger was significant because it 
led to reconciliation between groups inside and outside the territories; and, it separated the 
Palestinian movements from the Arab states. 
However, reconciliation between groups inside and outside the territories did not last 
long due to Israeli military policies, which, among other things, quashed the PRM.  The 
reconciliation of outside movements remained intact, and was reflected in the PNC Charter of 
1968, which joined Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PCP (later PPP)31 and other 
smaller organizations with the PLO.  Despite reconciliation of the movements on the outside, the 
PLO continued to be plagued with problems due its functional bodies being elitist, hierarchical, 
and failing to mobilize Palestinians inside the territories.  It was not until 1993, with the signing 
of the Oslo Accords, that the PLO entered the territories. 
In conclusion, mobilization has historically occurred outside of the Palestinian territories.  
The mobilization outside is in part a product of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967.  For the 
two larger movements, PANU and PRM, their mobilization inside the territories in the 1960s 
                                                            
31 The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) was created in 1951.  It became inactive in 1967, but was reconstituted in 





was short-lived because of Israeli military policies and military governance.  All of these 
historical movements utilized crises, deprivation, conflict, structural differentiation and political 
opportunities to mobilize.  The rise of these movements in the 1960s, despite their mobilization 
on the outside, was influential to those movements that emerged inside the territories in the 
1980s. 
The mobilization of the movements in the 1960s was influential in the sense that it helped 
in the development of a Palestinian national consciousness.  It is a Palestinian national 
consciousness that gave rise to the mobilization of movements inside the territories, notably the 
PIJ and Hamas. These movements therefore, are very much a part of the Palestinian national 
framework.  They are different from their predecessors in that they mobilized inside rather than 
outside the occupied territories.  The activists of the PIJ and Hamas were the children of the 
period of Israeli military occupation. 
Mobilization from the American Paradigm 
The conditions that led to the mobilization of the PIJ and Hamas were not the same as 
when the PLO and the other movements mobilized.32  This is largely because the PLO did not 
exist inside the Palestinian territories until 1993, after the signing of the Oslo Accords.  The PLO 
did not directly experience the conditions of military occupation.  The signing of the Accords in 
1993 is what established the Palestinian Authority. The creation of the Palestinian Authority 
began the period of transition from military governance to Palestinian governance of the 
territories.  The period at the time of the PIJ and Hamas mobilization was characterized by socio-
economic crises, deprivation, and a lack of structural differentiation.  According to the American 
paradigm, crises, deprivation, and level of structural differentiation do not cause mobilization.  
                                                            
32 Since all the movements that mobilized outside the territories joined the PLO in 1968, the use of “the PLO” will 
refer to all of these movements as a collective unit. 
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Rather, they provide political opportunities for activists to utilize.  For the American paradigm, 
the role of the activists enables mobilization.  This section examines the enabling explanatory 
variables and the way activists utilize them to explain the mobilizations of the PIJ and Hamas. 
Socio-Economic Crises, Deprivation and Structural Differentiation.  Crises in the form of 
unstable socio-economic conditions were present when both the PIJ and Hamas mobilized 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development).  After 1967, the Palestinian economy 
was dependent on the Israeli economy.  The following chart provides inflation rates for the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank and Israel from 1971 to 1991.  Inflation, according to Blejer and Guerrero 
(1990), are a measure for crises because the disaffected are unable to protect their real incomes. 






1971 22 16 12 
1975 54 43 39 
1981 110 114 117 
1985 338 321 305 
1991 7 12 19 
Source:  Hijjeh 1998 
 
The economic crises in the territories from 1967 to 1987, according to Yiftachel (1997) 
and Khawaja (1994), were a product of political instability due to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
The conflict negatively affected the economy and caused crises because Palestinians were 
dependent on Israel granting them work permits to enter Israel, as well as permits to move 
through checkpoints within the West Bank and Gaza, and on Israeli soldiers keeping checkpoints 
open and permitting access (Khalidi, 1998; Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997).  The economy during 
this period was also constrained by Israel permitting the inflow and outflow of goods and 
services (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997).  During times of high-intensity conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis, Israel prohibited the flow of goods and services (Khalidi 1998; Farsoun 
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and Zacharia, 1997; Khawaja, 1994).  Crises contributed to large segments of the Palestinian 
population becoming disaffected, which resulted in widespread deprivation (Yiftachel, 1997; 
Khawaja, 1994). 
According to the American paradigm, crises led to deprivation (Yiftachel, 1997 and 
1992; Zureik, 1993; Haidar, 1991).  Deprivation was present prior to and at the time when both 
the PIJ and Hamas mobilized (Yiftachel, 1997; Khawaja, 1994).  Deprivation was due to the 
Palestinian perception that occupation, and the Israeli military governance of the territories, 
hindered economic development and caused an uneven distribution of resources (Yiftachel, 1997 
and 1992; Zureik, 1993; Haidar, 1991).  Perceived deprivation was more important because 
Palestinians believed “they had been subjected to continuous policies of control and 
discrimination, including military rule and forced transfer of lands to [Israel], and a persistence 
of socio-economic and power disparities between [Palestinians] and [Israelis]” (Yiftachel, 1997: 
97-98). 
The actual policies of Israel in this period contributed to the perception of deprivation.  
For example, Israeli land policies resulted in the loss of a major source of livelihood for 
Palestinians.  Palestinian society was mainly agrarian, with most living in villages (Yiftachel, 
1997; Rubenstein, 1990).33  Another example relates to the Israeli policy of “Judaising” (Soffer 
and Finkel, 1989), which was implemented in response to the decisive Arab majority in the 
region and the expanding Palestinian population (Schnell, 1994).  Finally, Israeli immigration 
policy provided financial benefits, separate roads, and a better quality of life to Jewish 
immigrants willing to settle in Palestinian territories (Yiftachel, 1997; Carmon et al., 1991; 
                                                            
33 Land is important to both Palestinian culture and identity, which is most evident in the Palestinian national 
anthem, “My Land.”  Consequently, Israeli attempts to de-territorialize Palestinians with her socio-economic and 
security policies exacerbates perceived land deprivation, which is made more salient by actual loss of land and 
regional cohesion (Yiftachel, 1997; Rubenstein, 1990).   
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Falah, 1990).  Deprivation was also heightened due to no access to government institutions.  
Palestinians were not able to challenge any of these policies due to the lack of structural 
differentiation. 
According to the American paradigm, structural differentiation is important because it 
determines whether activists have access to the government to redress the causes of deprivation.  
From 1967 and until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 there was no Palestinian 
autonomous governance structure.  During the period from 1967 to 1993, it was under the direct 
governance of the Israeli military.    Israeli military administration resulted in the implementation 
of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and public administration in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and in 
the Gaza Strip (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997).  Separate military administrations were established 
in the West Bank and Gaza, but both were united under the direct control of the Israeli minister 
of defense. 
The lack of structural differentiation, and military laws prohibiting Palestinians from 
forming political collectivities, prevented legal challenges to the status quo within conventional 
political boundaries (Nasser-Najjab, 2005; Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; Khawaja, 1993; Taraki, 
1990).  Political institutions inside the territories were not adaptable, coherent, or autonomous; 
they were not free from the control and manipulation of the Israel military (Farsoun and 
Zacharia, 1997; Khawaja, 1993; Taraki, 1990).  Through these institutions, Israel provided basic 
resources to Palestinians for subsistence (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997).  The inability to legally 
challenge military policies or to participate in the governance of the territories, and the lack of 
resources needed for subsistence, led Palestinians to found civil society organizations. Until 
1987, these were apolitical (Nasser-Najjab, 2005).  Due to their apolitical nature, Israel tolerated 
their existence and operation.  Those perceived by Israel as being political or quasi-political in 
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nature were shut down and organizers imprisoned or exiled.  Civil society organizations, 
especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, provided socio-welfare 
resources to society (Nasser-Najjab, 2005).  The development of civil society was thus vital for 
providing political opportunities (Nasser-Najjab, 2005; Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997). 
In conclusion, the lack of structural differentiation between 1967 and 1987 resulted in the 
development of civil society organizations outside conventional political boundaries.  Civil 
society organizations were a product of crises, which caused widespread deprivation.  Political 
mobilization inside the territories from 1967 to 1987 was limited due to repressive measures.  
Repressive tactics included, but were not limited to, discriminatory policies34 (Farsoun and 
Zacharia, 1997; Taraki, 1990) and human rights abuses35 such as violence, imprisonment and 
exile (Khawaja, 1993).  From 1980 to 1983, the period in which PIJ mobilized, there was not 
widespread use of repression by the Israeli military authority.  Imprisonment for nonviolent 
political activity was limited, though those affected experienced torture and beatings (Political 
Terror Scale).  The limited use of repression by the military authority was attributed to the 
absence of armed resistance inside the territories.   During this period, the PLO from outside the 
territories was waging armed resistance.36 
From 1984 to 1987, there was not widespread use of repression, but there was an increase 
in its use (Political Terror Scale).  In particular, there was extensive political imprisonment,  
brutality, and unlimited detention.  There were also political executions. The increase in the use 
                                                            
34 Discriminatory policies included:  a prohibition on the right to express dissent and the formation of political 
collectivities; hindrance on freedom of movement by checkpoints, the permit system, and curfews; the issuance of 
identity cards and registration of all Palestinians with the military; Israeli employment practices and settlement 
policies; and, the uneven distribution of basic services such as health and education (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997). 
35 Human rights abuses such as violence and imprisonment occurred among those who attempted to express political 
dissent within the public sphere (Khawaja, 1993).  
 
36 See the historical section for a list of the Palestinian factions that joined the PLO in 1968.  Those factions and the 




of repression was attributed to the beginning of violent and non-violent resistance occurring in 
the territories.  Although the PIJ did not engage in armed resistance at its creation in 1981, it 
began engaging in armed resistance in 1984 (Hatina, 2001).37  The start of a violent and non-
violent resistance campaign inside the territories in 1984 followed a decline in resistance 
activities led from the outside by the PLO and its factions (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997). 
From 1967 to 1987 there were socio-economic crises, deprivation, and a lack of structural 
differentiation.  Although repression was not widespread, it was present.  There were no changes 
in the level of Israeli elite receptivity or the implementation of policies to alleviate some of the 
repressive measures of occupation inside the territories (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; Khawaja, 
1993).    It is in these conditions that the PIJ and Hamas mobilized.  The American paradigm 
posited that crises, deprivation, and structural differentiation do not cause mobilization.  Instead, 
they are enabling factors that provide political opportunities for the activists to use for 
mobilization.    The following sub-sections examine the movements’ use of these opportunities 
separately. 
The PIJ’s Use of Political Opportunities.  The activists that created the PIJ utilized the 
political opportunities provided by the lack of structural differentiation, lack of access to 
governance structures, lack of ability to form political parties or quasi-political collectivities to 
challenge the governance structure, and the use of repression.  Activists only indirectly used 
socio-economic crises, deprivation and the inadequate provision of and access to resources.  The 
purpose of the PIJ was to engage in resistance to obtain an independent sovereign state.  The 
creation of a Palestinian state in the territories encompassing the West Bank, Gaza, and East 
Jerusalem, according to the PIJ member Nafidh Azzam, is acceptable so long as Palestinians 
                                                            
37 See Hatina (2001) for a description of the PIJ’s non-violent resistance activities from 1981 to 1983 and violent 
resistance activities beginning in 1984. 
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have full sovereignty and control over their own security (Azzam, 2004).  At the time of 
mobilization, the activists of the PIJ were responding to the lack of structural differentiation in 
the territories governed by the Israeli military since 1967.  The PIJ, in the absence of 
sovereignty, would take part in municipal elections and vote in legislative and presidential 
elections under an autonomous governance structure (Azzam, 2004).  Participation, such as 
registering for and voting in elections, is an important domestic duty for formulating the 
Palestinian agenda and building a society based on justice, freedom, and dignity (Marzouq, 2007; 
Azzam, 2004).  Through this policy position, the activists were utilizing the lack of autonomous 
political institutions and access to governance structures. 
Activists utilized the lack of ability for political parties or quasi-political collectivities to 
form, participate and challenge the governance structure.  In particular, they used it to justify the 
adoption of resistance.  The use of resistance, according to the elected leader of PIJ, “is a 
legitimate right guaranteed by all divine and earthly laws for people [that are] subjected to 
foreign invasion or occupation” (Shallah, 1999).  Resistance implies not only armed conflict, but 
also non-violent protest (Hatina, 2001).  Armed conflict, according to the PIJ, cannot be used 
until the conditions are ripe and society is ready (Hatina, 2001).  This is the reason why the PIJ 
did not engage in armed conflict at its mobilization and instead engaged in non-violent protest 
over the absence of a Palestinian state.  Finally, the activists used the governing authority’s use 
of repression.  Resistance, according to the PIJ, is necessary as long as Israel continues its use of 
repression, including its policies of assassinations, killings, demolition of houses, and arbitrary 
arrests and detentions (Shallah, 1999).  A couple of years after the PIJ's mobilization, the use 
these tactics would provide justification for the adoption of armed resistance.  The PIJ activists 
did not directly use the opportunities provided by the lack of adequate provision of and access to 
 
  79
resources.  Rather, they indirectly used these as political opportunities.  Activists indirectly used 
them by relying on the linkages created with the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, which had 
established extensive social service networks throughout the territories (Abu Amr 1994).  By 
creating linkages between the constituents of the Brotherhood, the activists of the PIJ also 
utilized socio-economic crises and deprivation. 
 In summary, the PIJ directly and indirectly utilized all the political opportunities 
provided.  In particular, it indirectly used the opportunities provided by crises, deprivation, lack 
of access, and the inadequate provision of resources by the Israeli government.  It directly used 
the lack of structural differentiation and the absence of autonomous political institutions.  
Consequently, the PIJ case confirms the American paradigm’s proposition that movements 
utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  It does not confirm the proposition that the political 
opportunities were utilized to create linkages between individuals, institutions and organizations.  
For the PIJ, the creation of linkages merely served as a political opportunity for activists to use 
crises and deprivation for mobilization. 
Hamas’ Use of Political Opportunities.  The activists that created Hamas utilized the 
political opportunities provided by lack of structural differentiation, lack of access to governance 
structures, and lack of ability to form political parties or quasi-political collectivities to challenge 
the governance structure.  In contrast to the PIJ, Hamas activists directly used political 
opportunities provided by socio-economic crises, deprivation, and the inadequate provision of 
and access to resources.  Hamas activists did not use the political opportunity provided by the 
existence of repression.  The creation of Hamas, according to member Mahmoud Zahar, was for 
the attainment of a sovereign state wherein Palestinians could “enjoy freedom, independence and 
a dignified life with [its] neighbors in this Holy part of the world” (International Crisis Group, 
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2006).  Similar to the PIJ, the creation of a state encompassing the territories of the West Bank, 
East Jerusalem, and Gaza was sufficient.  It differed from the PIJ by further stating that the 
creation of a state, so defined, would be acceptable as long as all Palestinians voted for this 
option.  Hamas’ purpose, according to member Riad Mustafa, was to end occupation, and not the 
destruction of Israel (Rudolph and Van Engeland 2008).  The existence of Israel and its 
recognition by other states is a reality, according to Hamas member Ismail Haniyya.   Through 
Hamas’ policy position, activists were referring specifically to the lack structural differentiation 
and the inability of Palestinians to participate in the governance of the territories.  Participation 
of its members in society at-large is an important Islamic duty (Tamimi, 2007).  These positions 
particularly resonated with Palestinians living inside the territories, who had been subjected to 
military governance beginning in 1967. 
In contrast to the PIJ, Hamas activists utilized the opportunities provided by the 
inadequate provision of and access to resources.   Activists were able to utilize these due to them 
inheriting the infrastructure established by the Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood in the 
West Bank and Gaza built an extensive social-services network within the Palestinian territories, 
beginning in the 1930s.  Through its inheritance of the Brotherhood’s social services 
infrastructure, Hamas was able to provide needed resources to Palestinian society such as 
healthcare, employment, education scholarships, and training programs to help families become 
self-sufficient.  It is through the provision of resources that Hamas activists were able to create 
linkages between individuals, organizations and institutions and establish a support base inside 
the territories. 
In summary, Hamas activists utilized the lack of structural differentiation, lack of access 
to governance structures, and lack of ability to form political parties or quasi-political 
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collectivities to challenge the governance structure.  Finally, Hamas activists also used the 
political opportunities provided by socio-economic crises, deprivation, and the inadequate 
provision of and access to resources.  These opportunities were utilized for engaging in 
resistance.  Hamas, according to its elected leader, Khaled Mish’al, “is committed to restoring 
the natural rights of the Palestinian nation and to liberate all of the occupied territories, including 
occupied [East Jerusalem] and the repatriation of the refugees” (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 
2008; International Crisis Group, 2006).   Only resistance could obtain the restoration of the 
natural rights of Palestinians because of the lack of structural differentiation and access to 
governance structures.  The form of resistance adopted at its founding was strikes, 
demonstrations, and graffiti wars (Tamimi, 2007; Abu Amr, 1994).  Hamas’ use of political 
opportunities, with the exception of the use of repression, confirms the American paradigm’s 
proposition.  In particular, it confirms the proposition that activists utilize political opportunities 
to create linkages between individuals, institutions, and organizations to mobilize. 
The PIJ’s and Hamas’ Choice of Action. Whether action takes place inside or outside 
conventional boundaries, according to the American paradigm, depends on greater or less 
openness/access (Structural differentiation) and political opportunities (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 
1992; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 1973).  In the cases of the PIJ and Hamas, there was less structural 
differentiation and political opportunities available at the time of their mobilization.  Their 
mobilization occurred outside of conventional political boundaries.  These cases, therefore, 
confirm the proposition that the lack of structural differentiation and political opportunities 




Mobilization from the European Paradigm 
 In the 1960s, the Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated existing social cleavages.  The 
cleavages created a shared identity among Palestinian activists that formed Palestinian resistance 
movements outside of the territories.  These activists mobilized to affect relations of domination.  
The mobilizations of the PIJ and Hamas were also made possible by the creation of a shared 
identity among activists.  For the European paradigm, it is the creation of a shared identity that 
produces mobilization and not activists’ use of political opportunities.  Therefore, this section 
examines the role of identity in the mobilizations of the PIJ and Hamas. 
 Conflict and Cleavages.  The European paradigm posits that the presence of conflict 
exacerbates existing social cleavages.  Armed conflict was present when the PIJ and Hamas 
mobilized (Uppsala Conflict Database).  At the time the PIJ mobilized armed conflict was 
occurring between the PLO and its factions outside of the Palestinian territories.  At the time 
Hamas mobilized there was armed conflict both inside and outside the territories.  Since conflict 
was present prior to the mobilizations of both movements, that by itself cannot explain the 
exacerbation of existing social cleavages.    Crises, as will be demonstrated, also contributed the 
salience of existing social cleavages.  The salience of existing cleavages, according to the 
paradigm, provided a shared identity among activists. 
Conflict (Karmi, 2003; Pfeifer, 2003) and socio-economic crises (Pfeifer, 2003) made 
salient ethnic, religious, generational, educational, geographical, urban-rural, socio-economic, 
income, class-based, occupational, and ideological cleavages.  Ethnic cleavages inside the 
Palestinian territories exist between the Palestinian and the Jewish-settler populations (Flores, 
2006; Pfeifer, 2003; Moore and Aweiss, 2002; Khawaja, 1994); and, within Israel proper, 
between the Jewish-Israeli population and the Arab-Israeli population (Shabaneh, 2007; 
Yiftachel, 1997). These ethnic cleavages further spillover into religious cleavages, but are more 
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prevalent along the lines of the Jewish-settler or Zionism (Flores, 2006; Moore and Aweiss, 
2002) and the Palestinian-Muslim population located inside Palestinian territory—West Bank 
and Gaza (Flores, 2006; Pfeifer, 2003; Moore and Aweiss, 2002).38  Geographical cleavages 
exist due to the presence of a settler population and Israeli policies39 that hinder freedom of 
movement and promote forced expulsion of Palestinians from their homes (Shabaneh, 2007; 
Karmi, 2003). 
Generational cleavages, according to Karmi (2003), are sparked by children growing up 
seeing their parents helpless and perceiving them as being impotent to change existing 
environmental conditions.  Consequently, the younger generation is more politicized and active 
than the older generation (Pfeifer, 2003).  Educational cleavages are due to the inadequate 
educational system in the territories (Halstead and Affouneh, 2006).  From 1967 to 1994,40 
education was under Israeli control.  It was characterized, according to Halstead and Affouneh 
(2006), by crowded classes, with too many students jammed into small classrooms, double-shift 
schools, lack of teacher training, inadequate instructional materials, and limited funds allotted for 
curricula improvements. 
Urban-rural cleavages were created by new socio-economic and political classes 
replacing traditional socio-economic elites and political hierarchies (Farsoun and Zacharia, 
1997).  Socio-economic cleavages, according to Shabaneh (2007), were created by the 
constraints imposed on the physical expansion of Palestinians and by the weakening of 
                                                            
38 Interestingly, in a study conducted by Moore and Aweiss (2002), it was demonstrated that both Palestinians and 
Israelis (those living within Israel proper) share a dislike of the Jewish-settler or Zionist population living inside 
Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza). 
 
39 Policies such as the checkpoints and the permit system prohibit Palestinians inside the territories from being 
physically connected to one another and to those on the outside (Shabaneh, 2007; Karmi, 2003).   
40 In 1994, responsibility for education was transferred from Israeli-centralized control to the Palestinian National 




Palestinian society.  The weakening of society resulted in Palestinian institutional frameworks 
being undermined; the deepening of the subordination of Palestinian existence to the Israeli 
judicial system; and, the minimization of Palestinian opportunities to utilize natural resources.  
Income cleavages led to class-based cleavages (Shabaneh, 2007).  These were caused by more 
than half of the Palestinian population living below the poverty line.  Consequently, the quality 
of living standards, education, and healthcare services are low. 
Occupational cleavages inside and among Palestinian society include traditional, 
agrarian-based classes versus new intellectual and professional based classes (Khawaja, 1994) 
and, between laborers versus the professional class (Rosenfeld, 2004).  Cleavages also exist 
between Israeli laborers (largely the immigrant community in Israel) and Palestinian laborers 
(Pfeifer, 2003).  They exist between the Israeli intellectual and professional classes versus the 
Palestinian intellectual and professional classes  Ideological cleavages, according to Flores 
(2006) and Moore and Aweiss (2002), were found to exist between Zionism, Arab-nationalism, 
and Islamic nationalism. 
In conclusion, conflict and crises exacerbated existing social cleavages among 
Palestinians.  The European paradigm did not provide propositions regarding the type of 
cleavages made salient.  The cases of the PIJ and Hamas identified ethnic, religious, 
generational, educational, geographical, urban-rural, socio-economic, income, class-based, 
occupational and ideological cleavages.  According to the paradigm, these cleavages should have 
created a shared identity among the activists that mobilized to create the PIJ and Hamas. 
PIJ Identity.  For the paradigm, the shared identity among the PIJ activists should 
overcome existing cleavages to promote unity.  In Palestine, the rise of political Islam was 
attributed to two main developments in the 1970s.  The first development was widespread 
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discontent with secular-nationalism, represented by the PLO and its factions that were located 
outside of the territories (Hatina, 2001; Khalidi, 1997; Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997; Abu-Amr, 
1994; Taraki, 1990).    This development would not have been successful without the growing 
Islamic trend inside the territories, which had its ideological and socio-cultural basis in the 
Brotherhood.  The second development was the success of the Islamic movements in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt and Lebanon (Hatina, 2001; Abu-Amr, 1994).  This development made 
political action seem more realistic for those within the Islamic bloc, who were discontented with 
the status quo.  It is from this that the activists of PIJ emerged. 
The role for political Islam and the identity of PIJ is historically rooted in the “failure of 
subservient and secular Arab regimes, the entrenchment of the Zionist entity in the heart of the 
Muslim region…and the shallow approaches of the Islamic movement and the PLO” (Hatina, 
2001:49-50).  The PLO was seen as nothing more than a tool for the Arab regimes to placate 
their own domestic populace.  The Islamic movement was rejected for its passivity; in particular, 
its rejection of political Islam.  The PIJ activists believed that the current conditions in Palestine 
required immediate political action and not passivity or subservience. 
For the PIJ, the Palestinian problem could not be framed in the narrow context of 
Palestinian or Arab nationalism.  Rather, it is “purely an Islamic issue,” which required a 
commitment to two interrelated goals.  Those goals were “the liberation of Palestine and a pan-
Islamic revival in the region,” with the burden of the former placed on Palestinians and the latter 
on all Muslim countries (Hatina 2001: 51).  For the PIJ, liberation does not mean the immediate 
use of armed struggle.  According to one of the PIJ’s founders, Fathi Shaqaqi, armed struggle 
only becomes necessary when the conditions are ripe and until then the goal of Palestinian 
Muslims is to prepare (Hatina, 2001).  According to the elected head of PIJ’s Politburo, Dr. 
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Ramadan Shallah, the movement’s strategic plan conforms to the history of the struggle of the 
Palestinian nation, which is to confront Israel ideologically, politically and militarily (Rudolph 
and Van Engeland, 2008).  Resistance was not the main impetus for PIJ’s emergence.  The main 
impetus, according to the PIJ founder Fathi Shaqaqi, was the absence of Islam from Palestinian 
politics (Hatina, 2001: 26).  Therefore, the main impetus for PIJ was ideological differentiation 
from secular-nationalism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. 
Despite carving an ideological niche for itself within the status quo, PIJ has touted the 
importance of cooperation and dialogue with all Palestinians (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  
To promote cooperation and dialogue activists sought and maintained existing ties to all 
Palestinian movements in the territories.41  The best opposition methods to the political line 
taken by other factions, according to the PIJ, are dialogue and criticism.  Outside cooperation and 
dialogue, the PIJ has no specific policies for socio-economic and political development to 
differentiate itself from the PLO or others (Hatina, 2001).  Therefore, unlike Hamas, its policies 
do not directly address the specific social cleavages exacerbated by conflict and crises. 
The membership of the PIJ overcomes existing cleavages.   The movement’s leadership is 
comprised of educated young men in their early thirties from low-to- middle class origins 
(Hatina, 2001: 27).  In fact, one Islamic Jihad member said all the top elected leaders of the 
movement must have a doctorate (Marzouq, 2007). In addition to the dominant academic 
element, the leadership is comprised of former Fatah and Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) 
activists (Hatina, 2001: 27).  For example, some prominent figures at its inception included Jabr 
‘Ammar, a former officer in Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF) of the PLA; Ahmad Mahanna, 
former officer of PLF; Muhammad al-Jama’l, former PLF officer; and, Ramadan Shallah, former 
                                                            
41 It is interesting to note that, in present day, PIJ has an excellent relationship with Fatah.  After the Hamas-Fatah 
conflict in 2007, PIJ became even closer to Fatah than to Hamas.   
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secularist and current leader of the movement (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  Aside from 
its leadership, the PIJ members are also from the middle-to-lower socio-economic classes, 
ranging from rural to urban areas and spanning all generational cleavages (Marzouq, 2007).  
Male recruits under the age of eighteen and not mentally competent are not accepted.  The PIJ, 
unlike Hamas, does not accept women activists. 
In summary, the PIJ utilized the existing social cleavages that were exacerbated by 
conflict and crises to create a shared identity. While the paradigm does not posit the types of 
cleavages that activists utilize, the PIJ case suggests that ethnic, gender, generation, geographic, 
education, class-based, and ideological divisions provide a shared identity. Ideology was 
particularly important because the PIJ was able to create an ideological niche for itself by 
utilizing the failures of Palestinian nationalism and pan-Arabism and the passivity of the 
Brotherhood.  Specifically, the PIJ provided a platform for political Islam.  The common 
ideological framework provided by political Islam united the existing cleavages among the 
activists that mobilized to create the PIJ (Hatina, 2001). 
Hamas Identity.  The identity of Hamas is historically rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the West Bank and Gaza (Abu-Amr, 1994), which existed prior to the development of a 
Palestinian consciousness.  The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Palestine emphasized 
Islamization from the bottom-up and renounced violence as a means for addressing the 
Palestinian question.  Due to the apolitical nature of the Brotherhood, Israel allowed it to operate 
unfettered from 1967 and until its creation of Hamas in 1987.42  During this long period, the 
Brotherhood created extensive networks throughout the West Bank and Gaza, providing needed 
                                                            
42 Israel did not gain control over the territories until 1967.  Prior to 1967, the Brotherhood in Gaza was under the 
control of Egypt and in the West Bank under that of Jordan.  While it operated unfettered in Jordan, Egypt under 
Nasser would occasionally crackdown on the Brotherhood in Palestine because of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s 
activities in Egypt-proper (Chehab, 2007). 
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socio-welfare benefits to society.  Consequently, the constituency and membership of the 
Brotherhood were comprised of the middle-to-lower socio-economic classes.  Its membership 
and constituency overcame existing cleavages by including all segments of society, irrespective 
of age, education, ideology or gender. It was from the Brotherhood that Hamas was created. 
Hamas’ identity, therefore, is rooted in the Islamic reformist tradition of the Brotherhood, 
but it is a direct product of the 1987 Intifada (Mishal and Sela, 2006: 16).  It strategically co-
opted the discourse of the Palestinian nationalist movements, which incorporated Islamic values 
and symbols, and presented itself as an ideological alternative, defined by Palestinian Islamic 
nationalism.    It differentiated itself from the PIJ by emphasizing social development.  This 
provided the movement with greater identification with society.  It also does not just rhetorically 
address social cleavages, but attempts to provide programs to alleviate the conditions that create 
those divisions. 
In summary, Hamas utilized the existing cleavages that were exacerbated by conflict and 
crises to create a shared identity.  While the paradigm does not posit the types of cleavages that 
activists utilize, the Hamas case suggests that ethnic, gender, generation, geographic, education, 
class-based and ideological divisions provide a shared identity. In contrast to the PIJ, ideology 
was not particularly important for Hamas.  Rather, it attempted to differentiate itself from the PIJ 
by providing policies and programs that overcame cleavages.  Shared identities, according to the 
paradigm, produce mobilization to effect relations of domination. 
 Domination.  The types present included political and military domination. The 
mobilizations of both the PIJ and Hamas were to affect social domination caused by the presence 
of the Israeli military and Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza. In contrast to Hamas, 
the PIJ’s mobilization was also to affect relations of military domination.  These types of 
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subordination provided a link or shared sense of solidarity among the existing social identities in 
Palestinian society.  The cases of the PIJ and Hamas confirm the paradigm’s proposition that 
mobilization is to effect relations of domination. 
Choice of Action.  The paradigm posited that the relations of actors to the environment 
and their goals determine the possibilities and the limits of action.  The movements of the PIJ 
and Hamas defined themselves as a resistance and not a political party at their creation.  They 
both rejected Israeli military occupation and governance over the territories.  Consequently, their 
goals were an end to political domination and establishment of Palestinian sovereignty. 
Given the relations of the PIJ and Hamas to their environment and goals, the European 
paradigm would have predicted a different path for the PIJ than that of Hamas.  The PIJ’s 
mobilization was to affect domination caused by military occupation and the presence of Israeli 
settlers living inside the territories.  Its goals were to affect Israeli occupation ideologically, 
politically, and militarily.  Given the PIJ’s relation to its environment and its goals, the paradigm 
suggests that violent protest would more likely than non-violent protest.  In the case of Hamas, 
mobilization was to affect domination caused by military occupation, the presence of Israeli 
settlers, and economic exploitation.  The goals of Hamas were to build institutions, charities, and 
committees; to strengthen the roots of resistance in both the West Bank and Gaza; to develop 
military capabilities; and, to develop dialogue with its Arab and Islamic neighbors.  Given its 
goals and activists’ relations to their environment, the European paradigm does help to explain 
Hamas’ adoption of non-violent protest at its mobilization. 
In summary, the paradigm predicted that existing conflict exacerbated social cleavages to 
create a shared identity.  The examination of the PIJ and Hamas demonstrated that conflict and 
crises exacerbated existing social cleavages to create a shared identity among activists.  From 
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these cleavages, the PIJ and Hamas were able to develop a shared identity among not only 
activists but also their constituency.  These activists mobilized to create the PIJ and Hamas for 
affecting relations of political and military domination.  The creation of a shared identity was 
thus necessary for the mobilization of the PIJ and Hamas. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to examine the mobilizations of the PIJ and Hamas from within the 
American and European paradigms.  These paradigms are theoretical frameworks that exist 
within the social movement literature to explain movement mobilizations, each positing very 
different explanatory variables.  The American paradigm posited that the existence of socio-
economic crises, deprivation and less structural differentiation in Palestinian society provided 
political opportunities for both PIJ and Hamas to use, which enabled their mobilizations.   The 
European paradigm, on the other hand, posited that the existence of conflict and crises 
exacerbated social cleavages within Palestinian society and created shared identities among the 
activists within each of the movements, which enabled their mobilizations. 
 Given that both paradigms provided explanations for the mobilizations of the PIJ and 
Hamas, an argument can be made for the generality of the paradigms. An argument can also be 
made for an integrated approach.  The PIJ and Hamas would not have been able to mobilize 
without shared identities among activists and those identities being rooted within existing social 
cleavages.  Moreover, their mobilizations would not have been possible without the political 






Mobilizing the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG  
 
This chapter seeks to examine the cases of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf’s Group (ASG).43  The MNLF 
mobilized in 1969; the MILF mobilized in 1977; and, finally, the ASG mobilized in 1991.  At the 
time of their mobilizations, the MNLF engaged in non-violent resistance and the MILF and the 
ASG engaged in violent resistance (Banaloi, 2006; Anson, 2004; Bertrand, 1999; Roberts, 1995).  
The MNLF, similar to the PIJ and Hamas, adopted violent resistance after its initial mobilization 
(Roberts, 1995).  The MNLF, the MILF and the ASG are rooted in and shaped by the history of 
Muslim separatism in the Southern Philippines.  Understanding Muslim separatism is necessary 
to understand the mobilization of these movements. 
History of the Philippines and Muslim Separatism  
The Spanish colonized the Philippines in the 16th century.  In Spain’s 300 years of 
occupation, the Muslim regions of Mindanao and Sulu were never colonized.  Muslims were able 
to maintain their autonomy through armed resistance and governed themselves through three 
Muslim sultanates in Jolo, Sulu and Maguindanao (Buenida, 2005; Rinquet, 2002).  The three 
sultanates correspond to the three largest ethno-linguistic groups present in the Muslim regions.  
While there are ten different ethno-linguistic cleavages, the largest three include the 
                                                            
43 The MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG were selected for several reasons.  First, the MNLF was the dominant 
resistance movement that emerged in 1971; the MILF in the latter part of the 1977; and, ASG in 1989, after MILF 
began negotiating with the government  (Bertrand, 1999).  It should be noted that the ASG was not a politically 
dominant resistance movement within the Muslim regions.  Its popularity lies with the very poor, Muslim youth in 
Baislan and Sulu (Banaloi, 2006).  Secondly, their mobilizations occurred at different times.  Finally, the 




Maguindanaos, the Maranaos and the Tausugs (Dolan, 1981).  In addition to ethno-linguistic 
cleavages, the Muslim regions were plagued by Islamic ideological differences.  Consequently, 
the Muslim region prior to and after colonization has been tumultuous. 
When the Americans arrived in 1898, Muslims for the most part maintained a neutral 
stance in the armed resistance campaign waged by Filipino nationalists (Dolan, 1991).  An armed 
Filipino nationalist campaign actually began in the last part of the 19th Century.    Resistance to 
Spanish rule plagued the last quarter of the 19th Century in the Philippines.  Filipino elites 
educated abroad and influenced by the French revolution, led Filipino nationalists under the 
Propaganda Movement (PM).  The PM was not a secessionist movement.   Rather, exiled 
Filipino liberals and university students waged cultural and literary resistance.  They sought 
freedom of expression and equal representation and rights for all under Spanish governance.  The 
Spanish violently repressed the non-violent movement, which sparked the armed campaign.  
When the armed resistance was finally able to defeat the Spanish, with the help of the 
Americans, they were prohibited from taking over the country.  This sparked an all-out war 
between Filipinos against the Americans (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987). 
During the war between the Filipino nationalists and the Americans, Muslims maintained 
a neutral stance.  This neutral stance led to the signing of a Non-Interference Agreement in 1899 
by Muslims and the Americans.  In some of the Muslim regions, where Muslims had lost their 
territorial rights to the Spanish, armed resistance did occur.  By 1903, a Muslim province under 
American military governance was established (Dolan, 1991).  It was under American military 
administration that the most profound social, educational and governance changes occurred.  The 
most significant social change was the outlawing of slavery.  In the education arena, non-Muslim 
curricula replaced religious education.  The legal system was overhauled, which replaced Islamic 
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law with American law.  Finally, the local governance structures implemented thwarted the 
authority of traditional Muslim leaders.  These changes challenged the Islamic governance and 
social system that had been in place prior to Spanish colonization.  Consequently, armed 
insurrections throughout the Muslim region broke out and lasted for thirteen years.  By 1914, the 
Muslim region had been completely subjugated (Dolan, 1991). 
Throughout the entire Philippines, the Americans had established a temporary colonial 
governance system with the intent of the country’s eventual independence.  This type of 
administration was implemented to placate the anti-imperialist at home and the Filipino 
nationalists.  In so doing, the Americans incorporated the Philippine economic elite, wealthy 
landowners in particular, into the governance system.  They also developed a program of free 
and universal education.  This policy was particularly significant because it was something the 
Spanish never accomplished.  Rather, the Spanish set up religious schools for the purpose of 
conversion.  Finally, the Americans opened US markets to the wealthy landowners.  
Consequently, the colonial period brought wealth to the Filipino elite, but not to the masses.  
This was in large part because of the Filipino elite violently enforced the feudal agrarian system 
set up under the Spanish.  Consequently, the masses continued to suffer from poor living 
conditions.  The poor living conditions and lack of access to political institutions led to agrarian 
unrest, periodic peasant uprisings and massive labor strikes (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987: 37). 
The unrest of the 1920s and 1930s provided the impetus and mass support for armed struggle 
against the Americans.  The reemergence of armed struggle and the worldwide economic crisis 
of 1929 led to the passage of the Tydings-McDuffe Act of 1934, which established 1946 as the 
date for Philippine independence (Buenida, 2005; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987). 
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 Before this could happen, the Japanese attacked the Americans on Philippine territory in 
1941.  By 1942, the Japanese obtained the support of the same Filipino elite that the Americans 
had and established a subservient but independent Philippine Republic in 1943.  Despite the 
granting of independence, the Japanese conquest was opposed with violence.  The Huks and 
Muslim resistance waged an armed campaign against the Japanese, with the aid of the Americans 
(Buenida, 2005; Dolan, 1991; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987).  By 1944, coordinated resistance had 
removed the Japanese from Philippine soil.  The Americans disarmed, arrested and dismantled 
the governments set up by the same resistance that had helped them defeat the Japanese 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987: 69).  They reinstalled the same Filipino elite placed in power 
before the Japanese invaded.  The very same elite collaborated with the Japanese in 1941. 
 Two years after the American reconquest of the Philippines, independence was granted.  
The Philippines went from colony to neocolony.  That is, foreign domination was not removed 
despite the granting of independence (Buenida, 2005; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987).  In addition 
to this, the Filipino elite had continued a policy of repression rather than inclusion of the peasant 
majority.  That is, they maintained the feudal agrarian system put in place by the Spanish and 
continued by the Americans.  At independence, the Filipino elites utilized the police and armed 
vigilantes to enforce violently the collection of past rents (Dolan, 1991).  The peasants were 
unable to challenge the elites.  The electoral candidates that promoted changes in peasant living 
conditions were prohibited from running for office and some assassinated (Kerkvliet, 1973). 
Consequently, the Huk-Rebellion broke out in 1949. 
The Philippine government declared the Huk’s illegal, subversive, and sought aid from 
the American military to suppress the rebellion.   With Huk defeat in the early 1950s, the 
domination of the Filipino elite over the masses continued unchallenged.  The lower socio-
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economic classes were unable to challenge the elite despite the formally democratic governance 
system.  The political system only provided the means for the elite factions to rotate in office.  
Meanwhile, the living conditions of the vast majority were miserable and getting worse, which 
finally erupted into non-violent protest in the latter part of 1971 and the beginning of 1972 
(Frake, 1998).  Again, with the aid of the Americans, this protest was violently repressed by the 
Philippine government despite its non-violent nature.   The non-violent protest provided the 
Philippine government, led by Marcos, to justify the Declaration of Martial Law (Buenida, 
2005).  The Declaration of Martial Law sparked the Muslim Rebellion of 1972-1976 led by the 
Moro National Liberation Front (Frake, 1998). 
 Although Muslim separatism predates Spanish colonization, the conflict between 
Muslims and Filipinos has its origins in Spanish colonization.  It is largely a product of the 
former’s claim to independence and the preferential treatment given to the latter by the Spanish 
and Americans.  The present day conflict between Muslims and Filipinos is “…a contestation of 
democratic space” (Buenida, 2005: 2).  Muslims seek their right to self-determination and 
Filipinos seek affirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the territory.  The problem with the 
Muslim separatist movement, in both the past and present, is its lack of a national consciousness 
that transcends the ethno-linguistic identities.   Even opposition to Spanish rule failed to 
transcend these identities.  Although still plagued by ethno-linguistic cleavages, Muslims were 
able to find some common ground under American colonization in the 1920s (McKenna, 2008).  
This common ground has helped the contemporary Muslim separatist movement. 
 In the 1920s, Muslim leaders began asserting their rights to independence through non-
violent protest.  When the Americans denied their attempts, the separatist movement strategically 
adopted a Filipino identity to avoid losing power in the forthcoming independent Philippine state 
 
  96
(McKenna, 2008). Even after independence and until the 1960s, the Muslim elites continued to 
define Muslim consciousness through participation in the Philippine Republic (Buenida, 2005). 
Consequently, this generation never challenged the legitimacy of the Philippine government.  
This lack of challenge led to their own loss of legitimacy among the younger, educated Muslim 
population. 
The younger Muslim generation, composed of new educated intellectuals and 
professionals, revived the independence movement of the 1920s.  The trigger event that sparked 
Muslim unrest was the Jabadiah massacre led by the Philippine military under Marcos’ order 
(Buenida, 2005).  The younger generation demanded the Muslim elite to seek redress for the 
incident.  The Muslim elite remained silent, which sparked non-violent protest throughout the 
region (Frake, 1998).  Muslim non-violent protests were joined by simultaneous protests held by 
the Filipino younger, educated generation (Bertrand, 1999).  While the Muslims were protesting 
the injustice done to them by the Philippine government and the acquiescence of the Muslim 
elites, the Filipinos were protesting the growing centralization of power by the Philippine 
government and its use of violence (Buenida, 2005).  In coordination with the Philippine 
military, the Christian armed resistance movement called the Illagas began engaging in acts of 
violence against the Muslim population.  The Muslim students retaliated by forming their own 
armed bands called the Black Shirts.  It is in these conditions that the Moro National Liberation 
Front mobilized. 
The activists of the MNLF were the younger, educated Muslims that led the student 
protests against the Philippine government and the Muslim elite.  These students sought to forge 
a national identity among the inhabitants of the Muslim region.  While they were not successful 
in creating a national consciousness, the MNLF was successful in turning the derogatory Moro 
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appellation into a positive connotation among Muslims in the Philippines.  The positive 
connotation has resulted in the forging of a fragile but common identity among the inhabitants of 
the Muslim region, which has aided movements in their mobilizations. 
In summary, the Muslim regions located in the Southern Philippines have been plagued 
with almost constant armed insurrections since Spanish and American colonization.  The past 
Muslim separatist movements utilized crises, deprivation, conflict, structural differentiation and 
political opportunities to mobilize.  All of these movements sought some form of autonomy or 
independence.  Mobilization of past movements has shaped contemporary Muslim separatist 
movements.  The contemporary Muslim separatist movements, as the next section addresses, are 
like their predecessors in that they too are calling for some form of autonomy or independence. 
Mobilization from the American Paradigm 
The conditions in the Philippines were relatively similar to those under Spanish and 
American colonization that aided activists in the mobilization of Muslim separatist movements.  
The period prior to and at the time of the MNLF mobilization was characterized by socio-
economic crises, deprivation, and a transition from greater to less structural differentiation.  In 
the period prior to and at the time of the MILF mobilization was characterized by socio-
economic crises, deprivation, and a lack of structural differentiation.  The time period prior to 
and at the time of the ASG mobilization was characterized by was characterized by socio-
economic crises, deprivation, and a transition from less to greater structural differentiation.  
According to the American paradigm, these variables do not cause mobilization.  Rather, they 
provide political opportunities for activists to utilize.  For the American paradigm, the role of the 
activists enables mobilization.  This section examines the enabling explanatory variables and the 
way activists utilize them to explain the mobilizations of the MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG. 
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Socio-Economic Crises, Deprivation and Structural Differentiation.  Socio-economic 
crises were rampant in the Philippines throughout the 1950s and early part of the 1960s (Ando, 
1969).  The pace of industrialization faltered and manufacturing made little progress in 
increasing labor and capital resources, with little done to eliminate the mal-allocation of scarce 
resources (Williamson, 1969).  The 1970s witnessed deterioration in trade, while the 1980s was 
plagued with rising interest rates (Blejer and Guerrero, 1990).  Each crisis brought on drastic cuts 
in public expenditures and restrictive monetary policies.  The majority of the inhabitants of the 
Philippines, and those in the Muslim regions, suffered from high levels of poverty, 
unemployment and under-employment.  Those hardest hit were the poor and middle-class, both 
of whom were either unemployed or underemployed (Blejer and Guerrero, 1990; Kerkvliet, 
1973). The Muslim regions had the “…least access to education, health, electricity, transport, 
water, and sanitation services—the basic infrastructure required to sustain any growth or 
development” (Gutierrez and Borras, 2004: 2).   The following depicts the percent of GDP 
growth for the Philippines in comparison to Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Source:  Navaneentham (2002) 
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The slow growth of GDP demonstrates the economic difficulties of the Philippines in 
comparison to the other countries in the region.  These economic conditions had a profound 
effect on social relations (Ruland, 2003; Thompson, 1996; Blejer and Guerrero, 1990). Between 
1945 and 1960 many areas, especially those closely connected to Manila, experienced significant 
social crises due to abrupt changes in social relations.  Social relations, traditionally defined by 
kinship, familial, and factional relations, were replaced with individualism, instrumentalism, and 
politicization by the machine (Machado, 1974).   These socio-economic crises produced 
deprivation. 
Deprivation in the Philippines was exacerbated by government policies (Blejer and 
Guerrero 1990).   State immigration policies that began under colonization and intensified after 
independence granted Muslim-owned land to Catholic settlers, which resulted in the latter 
becoming the majority in the Muslim regions.  Consequently, land policies resulted in Muslims 
feeling pushed out of their ancestral home.  Education policies gave preference to the Catholic 
dominated areas.  The unequal and preferential treatment led to a rejectionist attitude among 
Muslims, which created real socio-economic inequalities. 
Government policies resulted in psychological strain and political crises (Ruland 2003; 
Thompson 1996; Blejer and Guerrero, 1990; Magdalena, 1977; Kerkvliet, 1973).  
Psychologically, Muslims perceived their Filipino counterparts are being more mobile, 
economically well off, urban, and aspiring (Magdalena, 1977).  Politically, there was a great 
disconnect between the people and politics, especially between the national political system and 
that of local administration (Blejer and Guerrero 1990; Kerkvliet 1973; Williamson 1969).  The 
relationship between local and national politics was based on favoritism and pork barrel politics 
that resulted in the national economy being plunged into large deficits, especially during times of 
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national election (Williamson 1969).  Government official gave jobs and resources to their ethnic 
clans44 and businesses owned by them, their families or friends (Ruland, 2003; Thompson, 1996; 
Blejer and Guerrero, 1990). 
The political divide deepened in 1972 when Marcos implemented martial law, which 
lasted officially until 1981, but unofficially until 1988 when he was removed from office by the 
“People Power Movement” (Beunida, 2005).  Even after Marcos was removed from power and 
Aquino replaced him in electoral victory, political turmoil continued to plague the Philippines 
economically and socially.  From the 1960s to the 1990s, crises resulted in deprivation that led to 
widespread dissatisfaction with the existing status quo.  In the Muslim regions, dissatisfaction 
extended to the Muslim elite due to their passivity.  The younger, Muslim generation was unable 
to challenge the existing status quo due to lack of access to government institutions.  Lack of 
access to government institutions was due to the nature of structural differentiation in the period 
of the 1960s to the 1990s. 
According to the American paradigm, the level of structural differentiation is important 
because it determines whether activists have access to the government to redress the causes of 
deprivation.  The level of structural differentiation differed when each of the movements 
mobilized.  Prior to 1965, the governance structure was formally democratic, with universal 
suffrage and a two-party system.  The two-party system consisted of the Partido Nationalista 
(NP) and the Liberal Party (LP), with political power vacillating between the two parties, but not 
without the use of violence, intimidation, corruption, and inter-and intra-factional rivalry 
(Thompson, 1996; Machado, 1974).  Factionalism was largely a product of the two-party system 
being comprised of coalitions of provincial family factions.  Power was derived from similar 
                                                            
44 Members of society relied on and established networks with prominent families in order to receive socio-welfare 
and socio-economic benefits (Machado, 1974).   
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provincial factions at the municipal level.  Provincial factional elite derived their power from 
extended kinship, familial, patron-client, personal, and cultural-linguistic relations (Machado, 
1974; Ando, 1969).  Therefore, access to the governance structure depended on the connections 
individuals had to provincial elite; and, successful candidacy for political office depended on not 
only connections, but also the ability of candidates to provide tangible and intangible political 
and economic favors to the provincial elite (Ando, 1969). 
Despite formal structural differentiation in the period prior to 1965, the activists that later 
formed the MNLF were excluded from the governance structure and the benefits derived from 
the patrimonial system due to their lack of connection with the provincial elite (Majul, 1999).  
Christian and Muslim elders dominated the provincial elite.  The Muslim elite, cooperating with 
the central Philippine government, were equivalent to the Muslim Yes-men in Algeria under 
French colonization.  Moreover, government policies intentionally excluded Muslims other than 
the Muslim elite from government positions and promoted underdevelopment in the Muslim 
dominated areas (Gutierrez and Borras, 2004). 
From 1965, when Marcos came to power in the presidential election, to his declaration of 
martial law in 1972, there was a gradual centralization of political power at the national level.  
Marcos was able to justify an increase in national power by promising to implement a mass-
based public works program to improve the quality of life for all Filipinos (Dolan, 1991).  
Unfortunately, economic growth slowed, the quality of life deteriorated, and crime and violence 
spiraled out of control.  Marcos responded with not only increased centralization but also 




The increase in violence used by the government led to renewed armed insurrections by 
the New People’s Army.  As a result, Marcos declared martial law in 1972.  The Declaration of 
Martial Law ended the transition period and ushered in a new period characterized by a lack of 
structural differentiation.   The period from 1972 to 1986 was characterized by authoritarianism 
and personal rule (Thompson, 1996; Macahdo, 1974).  It was authoritative and personalistic 
because governance centered on the friends and family of Marcos, who personalized state 
institutions and extorted wealth from society.  All non-governmental institutions were captured 
by the state, which was to say by Marcos friends and family.  Similarly, all governmental 
institutions, ranging from the bureaucracy to the military, were headed by those loyal to and 
directly connected with Marcos (Thompson, 1996).  Eventually, activities were curtailed with 
little outlet for dissent or participation.  It was under these governance conditions that the MILF 
mobilized.     The conditions when the MNLF mobilized permitted non-violent protest.  In 
contrast, the conditions when the MILF mobilized did not permit non-violent protest.  These 
same conditions characterized the period prior to the ASG mobilization.  The period prior to and 
at the time of its mobilization was characterized by a transition from less to greater structural 
differentiation.  The transition period begins with the removal of Marcos from power. 
Marcos was removed from power in February 1986, according to Ruland (2003), by a 
peaceful display of “people’s power.”  Corazon Aquino, whose husband, a leading opposition 
figure who was assassinated by Marcos in 1983, came to power after supposedly losing the 
Marcos-rigged 1986 Presidential election (Ruland, 2003: 464).  She came to power on the 
coattails of the “people’s power,” but without a strong organization of her own.  Taking power 
after decades of mismanagement by the Marcos family, the scope of the problems the new 
regime faced was enormous. And there were a series of division between the country’s new 
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rulers. The new era saw limited political, social and economic reform, constant attempts of 
military coups, and the occasional use of force during massive demonstrations.  Aquino, 
according to Thompson (1996), was able to maintain power by acquiescing to the military’s 
demands, reversing her stance on land reforms, halting investigations into human rights abuses 
by the military, and maintaining the socio-economic and political patronage system established 
under Marcos. 
In conclusion, the transition from greater to less structural differentiation when the 
MNLF mobilized resulted in protests occurring outside conventional political boundaries.  These 
protests did not occur through until crises caused widespread deprivation among all segments of 
the population.45  When protests erupted, Marcos responded with violence to suppress all 
segments of society (Majul, 1999; Dolan, 1991).   There was no opposition to the use of 
government violence or policies implemented to redress grievances (Ruland, 2003; Thompson, 
1996).  After martial law was declared in 1972, all forms of non-violent protest ceased to exist 
due to the government’s use of murder, disappearance and torture on all segments of the 
population (Political Terror Scale).  Consequently, the form of protest after 1972 was violent. 
 Non-violent protests did not occur again until the mid 1980s (Ruland, 2003).  From 1972 
to the early 1980s, there was no opposition to the government’s use of violence but policies were 
implemented redress grievances (Ruland, 2003; Thompson, 1996).  For example, elites lobbied 
for the implementation of socio-economic and welfare policies in the Muslim region; and, 
Marcos granted concessions to Muslim and communist resistance movements (Ruland, 2003; 
Thompson, 1996; Machado, 1974; Ando, 1969).  It was not until the mid-1980s that elite 
opposition began criticizing the government’s use of repression (Dolan, 1991).  These conditions 
                                                            




characterized the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG mobilizations.  The American paradigm posited 
that crises, deprivation, and structural differentiation do not cause mobilization.  Instead, they are 
enabling factors that provide political opportunities for the activists to use for mobilization.    
The following sub-sections examine the movements’ use of these opportunities separately. 
The MNLF’s Use of Political Opportunities.  The activists that created the MNLF utilized 
political opportunities provided by the transition from greater to less structural differentiation, 
lack of access to and autonomous political institutions, socio-economic crises and deprivation.  
The creation of the MNLF, according to founding member Nur Misurari, was for the 
establishment of an independent state, the withdrawal of government troops in the Southern 
Philippines, a return of ancestral lands, greater autonomy, and the ability to implement Islamic 
law in Muslim dominated areas (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Bertrand, 1999).  By calling 
for independence and greater autonomy in the Muslim region, the MNLF activists invoked the 
memory of the Muslim separatist movement of the 1920s (Dolan, 1991).  The MNLF presented 
itself as representing the Muslim population, which enabled its activists to lead the Muslim 
masses in the non-violent protests of the late 1960s.  The rise in prominence of the MNLF after 
its creation also enabled the activists to lead the region in the first Muslim rebellion since 
independence (Bertrand, 1999). 
The MNLF thereby signified its rejection to the status quo, represented by the central 
Philippine government and the traditional Muslim elite in the Muslim region.  The younger 
Muslim generation, fed up with economic inequality blamed the central Philippine government 
and the Muslim elites in the region for their collaboration (Frake, 1998).  Rejection of the status 
quo resonated particularly with the younger, Muslim generation that were most affected by the 
unstable socio-economic conditions. While the MNLF did not seek Filipino acceptance and 
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participation in its movement, it strategically utilized the existing conditions and anti-Marcos 
sentiment to attempt to forge a common identity among Muslims and Filipinos living in the 
Muslim regions.  It also utilized external linkages created by the MNLF activists to promote 
socio-economic programs and to facilitate the provision of socio-welfare benefits to those in the 
region. The use of external linkages in this way signified the government’s and the Muslim 
elite’s inability to promote socio-economic development and their inadequate provision of 
resources to all living in the Muslim region. Consequently, the MNLF’s anti-Marcos political 
program resonated with Muslims and Filipinos living in the Muslim region (Bertrand, 1999; 
Frake, 1998; Dolan, 1991). 
In summary, the MNLF utilized political opportunities provided by the transition from 
greater to less structural differentiation, lack of access to and autonomous political institutions, 
socio-economic crises and deprivation.  Consequently, the MNLF case confirms the American 
paradigm’s proposition that movements utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  It does not 
confirm the proposition that the political opportunities were utilized to create linkages between 
individuals, institutions and organizations.  For the MNLF, the creation of linkages merely 
served as a political opportunity for activists to use crises and deprivation for mobilization. 
The MILF’s Use of Political Opportunities.  The activists that created the MILF utilized 
political opportunities provided by lack of structural differentiation, lack of autonomous political 
institutions, and government use of repression.  The creation of the MILF in 1977 was a response 
to the actions of the MNLF (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 1998).  
Consequently, the movement’s mobilization has its roots in the MNLF and the historical, 
Muslim separatist movement.  The MILF activists called for the creation of an independent state 
in the Muslim region.  This call was a rejection of the MNLF signing of the 1976 Tripoli 
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Agreement.  By signing the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF relinquished its call for independence 
and accepted autonomy in the Muslim region (Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 1998).  The MILF rejected 
any form of autonomy as long as the Philippine government had central decision-making 
authority over the region and control of the purse strings (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  
The formation of the MILF thereby signified lack of structural differentiation and rejection of the 
status quo, represented by the Philippine government and the MNLF.  It also rejected the 
MNLF’s decision to halt armed resistance due to the Philippine government’s continued use of 
repression in the Muslim region. 
In summary, the MILF utilized political opportunities provided by lack of structural 
differentiation, lack of autonomous political institutions, and government use of repression.  .  
Consequently, the MILF case confirms the American paradigm’s proposition that movements 
utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  It does not confirm the proposition that the political 
opportunities were utilized to create linkages between individuals, institutions and organizations.  
For the MILF, it utilized the linkages created by the MNLF for mobilization.  In contrast to the 
MNLF’s use of external linkages, the MILF did not use them at its inception to promote socio-
economic development programs or provision of resources to the region.  Rather, it used the 
linkages to continue the armed resistance campaign initiated by the MNLF in the early 1970s. 
The ASG’s Use of Political Opportunities.  The activists that created the ASG utilized 
political opportunities provided by lack of structural differentiation, lack of autonomous political 
institutions, and government use of repression.  The creation of the ASG in 1991 was due to 
dissatisfaction among the younger, Muslim activists of the MNLF and the MILF (Banaloi, 2006; 
Montesano, 2003; Roberts, 1995).  The ASG, thus, sought to bridge the gap between these 
movements with its creation.  The younger, Muslim activists of the MNLF and the MILF were 
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dissatisfied with their leaderships’ failure to improve the conditions for the Muslim region.  
Consequently, the ASG has its roots in the historical, Muslim separatist movement.  The ASG, 
according to founder Abdurajak Janjalani, called for the creation of an independent Islamic state 
and the implementation of Islamic law in the Muslim region and the continuation of armed 
resistance as long as the Philippine government continues to oppress the Muslim population 
(Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Banaloi, 2006). 
The formation of the ASG thereby signified lack of structural differentiation and rejection 
of the status quo, represented by the Philippine government, the MNLF and the MILF.  It also 
rejected any attempts to halt armed resistance due to the Philippine government’s continued use 
of repression in the Muslim region.  In summary, the ASG utilized political opportunities 
provided by lack of structural differentiation, lack of autonomous political institutions, and 
government use of repression.  The ASG case confirms the American paradigm’s proposition 
that movements utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  It does not confirm the proposition 
that the political opportunities were utilized to create linkages between individuals, institutions 
and organizations.  For the ASG, it utilized the linkages created by the MNLF for mobilization.  
Similar to the MILF, the ASG did not use them at its inception to promote socio-economic 
development programs or provision of resources to the region.  Rather, it used the linkages to 
continue the armed resistance campaign initiated by the MNLF in the early 1970s and continued 
by the MILF in the 1980s. 
The MNLF’s, the MILF’s, and the ASG’S Choice of Action.  According to the American 
paradigm, action occurring inside or outside conventional boundaries depends on greater or less 
openness/access (structural differentiation) and political opportunities (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 
1992; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 1973).  In the case of the MNLF and the ASG, transitional structural 
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differentiation was underway.  In the case of the MILF, there was a lack of structural 
differentiation.  In all three, the movements utilized political opportunities to mobilize.  
Mobilization in all three movements occurred outside conventional political boundaries.  The 
cases of the MNLF and the ASG demonstrate that transitional structural differentiation and 
political opportunities explain participation outside conventional political boundaries.  The case 
of the MILF demonstrates that lack of structural differentiation and political opportunities 
explain participation outside political boundaries.  All of these cases confirm the proposition 
posited by the American paradigm. 
Mobilization from the European Paradigm 
  Throughout the history of the Muslim regions in the Southern Philippines, there have 
been conflicts that exacerbate existing social cleavages.  The cleavages created a shared identity 
among the activists of the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG that mobilized to affect relations of 
domination.  The mobilization of each movement was made possible by the creation of a shared 
identity among movement activists.  For the European paradigm, it is the creation of a shared 
identity that produces the mobilization and not activists' use of political opportunities.  
Therefore, this section examines the role of identity in the MNLF’s, the MILF’s and the ASG’s 
mobilization. 
Conflict and Cleavages.  The European paradigm posits that the presence of conflict 
exacerbates existing social cleavages.  Armed conflict was present when the MNLF, the MILF 
and the ASG mobilized (Uppsala Conflict Database).  Prior to the MNLF’s mobilization in 1969, 
there was no conflict.  Beginning in 1969, the Communist People’s Party through its armed 
wing, the NPA, waged an armed campaign against the central government that lasted until 2006.  
In the Muslim regions, armed conflict between the MNLF and the central government occurred 
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from 1972 to 1990.  From the creation of the MILF in 1977 and until 1990, activists coordinated 
with the MNLF in its armed campaign.  Similar to the MILF, the ASG has waged an armed 
campaign against the Philippine government since its inception.  Since conflict was present prior 
to the mobilizations of the MILF and the ASG, the argument posited is that it alone cannot 
explain the exacerbation of existing social cleavages.    Crises, as will be demonstrated, also 
contributed the salience of existing social cleavages.  The salience of existing cleavages, 
according to the paradigm, provided a shared identity among activists. 
Conflict (Frake, 1998; Brown, 1988) and socio-economic crises (Blejer and Guerrero, 
1990) made salient ethnic, regional, urban-rural, educational, and economic or class-based 
cleavages.  Ethnic cleavages exist between the Muslim and Filipinos living in Muslim regions 
and between the Muslim region and the majority Filipino regions (Frake, 1998; Brown, 1988).  
The ethnic cleavage was in part due to education and economic or income-based inequalities 
(Magdalena, 1977; Kerkvliet, 1973; Ando, 1969; Williamson, 1969).   Regional, urban-rural and 
linguistic cleavages also exacerbated ethnic cleavages due to the on-going conflict and socio-
economic crises (Blejer and Guerrero, 1990).  Within the urban-rural cleavages, there were class-
based cleavages between the lower, middle and upper socio-economic classes.  All of these 
cleavages were not only interrelated and have their roots in the long-standing conflict, but were 
also made salient by the existing political conditions.  In particular, socio-economic crises, 
deprivation, lack of autonomy in existing political institutions, and inadequate provision of 
resources created divisions in the Philippines (Dolan, 1991). 
In conclusion, conflict and crises exacerbated existing social cleavages among Muslims 
living in the Philippines.  The European paradigm did not provide propositions regarding the 
type of cleavages made salient.  The cases of the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG identified 
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ethnic, regional, urban-rural, educational, and economic or class-based cleavages.   According to 
the paradigm, these cleavages should have created a shared identity among the activists that 
mobilized to create each of the movements.  The identity of each movement should overcome 
existing cleavages to promote unity. 
The MNLF Identity.   At its inception, the identity of the MNLF was defined by Islamic 
nationalism (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008; Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 1998).  For the MNLF, 
the role of the state is to promote faith by providing institutions and resources to society.  By 
defining its Muslim identity as such, the activists sought to transcend existing Islamic political 
ideological divisions.  According to the Ira Lapidus (2002), the Muslim region in the Philippines 
is composed of Sufism, Salafiyyism and Islamic reformism (the Brotherhood tradition).  
Consequently, the MNLF was able to bridge the gap between the exiled Muslim elite and the 
younger, Muslim generation at its inception.  It was not able to overcome the existing cleavage 
between the Muslim elite inside the Muslim region and the younger, Muslim generation.  This is 
largely because activists sought to challenge their dominant roles in the existing socio-political 
order. 
The MNLF also sought to overcome the existing ethnic cleavage present between 
Muslims and Filipinos living in the region.  In particular, activists sought to forge a national 
identity transcending all existing cleavages within the Muslim region.  Founder Nur Misurari 
stated “the correct name [of the inhabitants of the region] is Moro because [it] is our 
nationality...Christians can also be Moros.  [T]here shall be no stressing the fact that one is a 
Tausugs, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranaos, or a Badjao, 
[one] is only a Moro” (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008: 153).  In order to overcome these 
existing cleavages, the MNLF adopted an anti-Marcos political program (Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 
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1998).  It also sought to overcome existing cleavages by utilizing external linkages to establish 
socio-economic development programs and to facilitate the distribution of resources to the 
Muslim region. Finally, the MNLF was able to overcome educational cleavages through its 
membership and leadership.  In summary, the MNLF attempted to create a shared identity that 
overcame some but not all the existing cleavages.  The MNLF addressed economic or class-
based, ethnic, educational, generational and ideological cleavages.  It failed to address regional 
and urban-rural cleavages. 
The MILF Identity.  The identity of the MILF was defined by Islamic reformism, which 
promoted the restoration and development of civilization in the Muslim region (Rudolph and 
Van Engeland, 2008). For the MILF, the identity of the state is to be Islam, with its role being 
the promotion the faith by providing resources to religious institutions and the implementation of 
Islamic law.   By defining its Muslim identity as such, the activists sought to go beyond the 
MNLF’s attempt to transcend existing Islamic political ideological divisions by targeting the 
issues that concerned the traditional Muslim elite. 
The MILF also sought to overcome the existing ethnic cleavage present between Muslims 
and Filipinos living in the region.  The MNLF had sought to do this by attempting to create a 
national identity that could resonate among all living in the region, which the MILF rejected 
(Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 1998).  Instead, activists sought to overcome the existing ethnic cleavage 
through membership.  The MILF leadership was comprised mainly Maguindanao and Maranao 
activists, but its members were of multi-ethnic background (International Crisis Group, 2006).  
Through policies of coordination and cooperation, the MILF sought to overcome divisions along 
religious and secular orientations (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  Generationally, it 
included the young and old.   Similar to MNLF, however, the MILF had no political program 
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outside of calling for an independent state in the Muslim region (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 
2008).  Despite its lack of programs, the MILF activists devoted themselves to securing 
diplomatic and material backing from outside the Muslim world for the promotion of socio-
economic development programs (International Crisis Group, 2006).    In summary, the MILF 
attempted to create a shared identity that overcame some but not all the existing cleavages.  
While it addressed economic or class-based, ethnic, educational, generational and ideological 
cleavages, it failed to address regional and urban-rural cleavages. 
The ASG Identity.   The identity of the ASG incorporates both the Islamic nationalist and 
reformist traditions (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).   Through its political program, the ASG 
sought to bridge the gap between the MNLF and the MILF in particular.46  It differs from both 
the MNLF and the MILF in the sense that its leadership, not just its membership, incorporates 
educational, ethnic, linguistic and generational cleavages to promote unity (Banaloi, 2006; 
International Crisis Group, 2006).   Similar to both the MNLF and the MILF, it failed to develop 
specific socio-economic and political programs to redress grievances in the Muslim regions 
(Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  In contrast to the other two movements, the ASG never 
utilized external linkages to promote development programs or the provision of resources to its 
constituency.  It did use kidnapping-for-ransom tactics to acquire resources for its membership 
but not constituency (Rudolph and Van Engeland, 2008).  Consequently, it was not able to 
overcome existing economic or class-based cleavages outside of its membership.  In summary, 
the ASG attempted to create a shared identity that overcame some but not all the existing 
cleavages.  It addressed ethnic, educational, generational and ideological cleavages, but failed to 
address economic or class-based, regional and urban-rural cleavages. 
                                                            
46 See the discussion of the ASG in the section on the American paradigm for more details. 
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Domination and Choice of Action. The ASG, the MNLF and the MILF all had shared 
identities that were created by some but not all of the existing cleavages that were exacerbated by 
conflict and crises.  Shared identities, according to the paradigm, produce mobilization to affect 
relations of domination.  The MNLF, the MILF and the ASG sought to affect political 
domination by calling for the creation of an independent state in the Muslim region at the time of 
their inception (International Crisis Group, 2006; Banaloi, 2006; Bertrand, 1999; Frake, 1998).  
The MILF and the ASG also sought to affect military domination by waging an armed resistance 
campaign at the time of their inception (International Crisis Group, 2006; Banaloi, 2006).  These 
types of subordination provided a link or shared sense of solidarity among the existing social 
identities in the Muslim region.  The cases of the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG confirm the 
paradigm’s proposition that mobilization is to effect relations of domination. 
The European paradigm posited that the relations of actors to the environment and their 
goals determine the possibiliteis and limits of action.  All of the movements herein examined 
sought autonomy or the creation of an independent state in the Muslim regions.  Given the 
subordinate status of Muslims to their Filipino counterparts and their inability to affect change 
within the conventional realm of politics, action occurred outside political boundaries.  The 
MNLF engaged in non-violent resistance at its inception, whereas MILF and ASG both engaged 
in violent resistance.  In summary, the paradigm predicted that existing conflict exacerbated 
social cleavages to create a shared identity.  The examination of the MNLF, the MILF and the 
ASG demonstrated that conflict and crises exacerbated existing social cleavages to create a 
shared identity among activists.  From these cleavages, the movements were able to develop a 
shared identity among not only activists but also their constituency.  These activists mobilized to 
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create the MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG for affecting relations of political and military 
domination.  The creation of a shared identity was thus necessary for their mobilizations. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the mobilizations of the MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG 
from within the American and European paradigms. These paradigms are theoretical frameworks 
that exist within the social movement literature to explain movement mobilizations, each 
positing very different explanatory variables.  The American paradigm posited that the existence 
of socio-economic crises, deprivation and level of structural differentiation in Philippine society 
provided political opportunities for activists of the movements to use, which enabled their 
mobilizations.   The European paradigm, on the other hand, posited that the existence of conflict 
and crises exacerbated social cleavages within the Muslim region in Philippine society and 
created shared identities among the activists within each of the movements, which enabled their 
mobilizations. 
 Given that both paradigms provided explanations for the mobilizations of the MNLF, the 
MILF and the ASG, an argument can be made for the generality of the paradigms. An argument 
can also be made for an integrated approach.  These movements would not have been able to 
mobilize without shared identities among activists and those identities being rooted within 
existing social cleavages.  Moreover, their mobilizations would not have been possible without 








General Conclusions:   
The Mobilization of Contemporary Islamic Resistance Movements 
 
 
Recent world events, ranging from international violence to elections, have propelled 
academics and policymakers to examine Islamic resistance movements more closely.  Previous 
studies of such movements, in both the English and Arabic literature, has been limited to 
historical case studies.  The lack of systematic cross-case comparisons has limited the 
development of generalizable propositions regarding movement mobilization. In a first effort to 
remedy this gap in the literature, this study examines the mobilization of Islamic resistance 
movements—the FIS, the PIJ, Hamas, the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG—in three different 
countries located in three different regions. Mobilization was examined utilizing the American 
and European paradigms within the social movement literature.  The American paradigm 
emphasized the role of activists for mobilization, whereas the European paradigm emphasized 
identity.  The central goal of the study is to answer the following: Do Islamic resistance 
movements share common mobilization characteristics? 
Mobilization of Islamic Resistance from the American Paradigm 
 
In the American paradigm, theorists posited that contemporary movements are a product 
of the political context.  That is, political climate independent of movement mobilization affects 
the outcome of movements (Edelman, 2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Rochon, 
1990).  Movements, therefore, are symptoms of socio-economic crises (Edelman, 2001), 
deprivation and structural differentiation (Champagne 1983), which provide political 
opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999).  Mobilization is made possible by movements, who 
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are socially connected, using political opportunities to expand and gain a stake in the political 
and social system (Edelman, 2001; Cohen, 1985).  They do so by relying on the linkages 
between individuals, organizations and institutions, which blurs the line between them and 
established political channels such as political parties (Rochon, 1990).  The blurring of the line 
results in changes in the level of elite receptivity, changes in elite ability and willingness to 
repress movements, and the presence of elite allies (Edelman, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Rochon, 
1990).  It also influences the type of protest, as both strategies and tactics are not chosen in a 
vacuum (Meyer 1999).  Choice of action, then, depends on whether there is greater or less 
openness/access (structural differentiation) and political opportunities (repression, participation, 
and resources) available (Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1992; Tilly, 1978; Eisenger, 1973).  The 
explanatory variables the American paradigm is concerned with included socio-economic crises, 
deprivation, structural differentiation, political opportunities, elite receptivity, and choice of 
action.  The following table provides the findings across the cases, which is followed by a 
discussion.  The table corresponds to the one presented in chapter two, which was used to guide 
data collection.  Column one lists the variables of concern.  Column two restates the focused, 










Table 6.1  Mobilization of Islamic Resistance Movements from the American Paradigm 




Were socio-economic crises 
present?  If so, did they lead to 
deprivation? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Deprivation Was deprivation present?   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Was there greater structural 
differentiation?   No No No No No No 100% 
Was there less structural 
differentiation? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 50% 
Was there transitional structural 
differentiation? Yes No No Yes No Yes 50% 
Was political participation 
prohibited? No Yes Yes No Yes No 50% 
Structural 
Differentiation 
 Was there access to government 




Crises/Deprivation Did movements utilize these for 
mobilization? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 67% 
Structural 
Differentiation 
Did movement use the level of 
structural differentiation for 
mobilization? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
 Repression Did movements use for 
mobilization? No Yes No No Yes Yes 50% 
Did the governing authority 
provide subsistence resources to 




Did movements use inadequate 
government provision of 
resources? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 67% 
Did society have access to those 
resources?   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Access to Resources 
Did movements use this for 
mobilization? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 67% 
Were the political institutions 
free from government 
manipulation?   No No No No No No 100% 
Autonomous Political 
Institutions 
Did movements utilize this for 
mobilization? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Did society have access to 
political institutions?   Yes No No No No No 83% 
Access to Political 
Institutions 
Did movements utilize this for 
mobilization? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Were there changes in elite 
receptivity to the use of 
repression?   No No No No No Yes 83% 
Did movements use this for 
mobilization? No Yes Yes No No No 33% 
Were there attempts by elites to 
ally societal grievances?   Yes No No No Yes Yes 50% 
Elite Receptivity 
Did movements utilize this for 





According to the paradigm, crises, deprivation and level of structural differentiation do 
not cause mobilization.  Rather, they provide political opportunities for activists to use for 
mobilization.  Socio-economic crises were present when all six movements mobilized, despite 
temporal differentiation.  The causes for such crises differed, however.  When the FIS mobilized 
in Algeria, the crisis was a product of declining oil revenues, failed economic policies, and a cut 
in state socio-welfare benefits.  When the PIJ and Hamas mobilized in Palestine, the crisis was a 
product of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  When the MNLF and the MILF mobilized, 
the crisis was a product of misallocation of resources, a decline in trade and industrialization, and 
a cut in socio-welfare benefits.  When the ASG mobilized, the crisis was a product of 
government corruption, rising interest rates, high levels of poverty, unemployment and 
underemployment, and severe cuts in public expenditures. These socio-economic crises led to 
deprivation in the societies in which all of the movements mobilized. 
Socio-economic crises and deprivation were exacerbated by the level of structural 
differentiation.  According to the paradigm, structural differentiation is important because it 
determines whether activists have access to the government to redress the causes of deprivation. 
In the cases examined, less structural differentiation characterized the political environment in 
which three of the movements’ mobilized.  In particular, lack of structural differentiation was 
present when the PIJ, Hamas, and the MILF mobilized.  In the other three cases, there were 
transitions underway.  In the cases of the FIS and the ASG, the transitions taking place were 
from less-to-greater structural differentiation; and, in the case of the MNLF, the transition from 
greater structural differentiation to less structural differentiation was underway. 
In the cases where there was a lack of structural differentiation, all members of society 
were prohibited from political participation and accessing the government to redress grievances.  
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In contrast, political participation and access to the government to redress grievances were 
limited in the cases where transitional structural differentiation was underway.  In all the cases, 
the ability for members of society to redress grievances was confounded by lack of autonomous 
political institutions and government use of repression. With the exception of the period when 
the ASG mobilized, the political elites in each of the countries did not oppose the use of 
repression.  Attempt to mediate grievances was made by the governing authority in each case to 
provide members of society with resources for subsistence living.  These conditions provided 
political opportunities for the activists of each Islamic resistance movement to utilize for 
mobilization. 
The political opportunities utilized by activists from all the Islamic resistance movements 
included the level of structural differentiation and access to and lack of autonomous political 
institutions.  Activists of the Islamic resistance movements used these opportunities to create 
linkages between individuals, institutions and organizations, which was necessary for their 
mobilizations.  The creation of linkages did not blur the line between them and conventional 
political parties or produce changes in elite receptivity.    Finally, use of crises and deprivation, 
access to and inadequate government provision of resources, elite receptivity and government 
use of repression were not important for the activists of Islamic resistance movements.  Political 
opportunities were also important for the type of action adopted by activists. 
For the American paradigm, political opportunities and structural differentiation define 
the choice of action.  For Islamic resistance movements, a lack of and transitional structural 
differentiation and use of the opportunities provided by lack of access to autonomous political 
institutions explained participation outside conventional political boundaries.  Crises, 
deprivation, and access to and lack of inadequate government provision of resources were also 
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important for the activists of the FIS, the PIJ, Hamas and the MNLF, who adopted non-violent 
protest at the time of their mobilization.  These opportunities were different from the movements 
that engaged in violent protest.  The activists of the MILF and the ASG adopted violent protest at 
the time of their mobilization.  The opportunities that these two movements had in common, 
which differed from the others, were widespread government use of repression and lack of 
access to and lack of government provision of resources. 
The findings across the violent and non-violent cases permit the articulation of several 
propositions regarding Islamic resistance movements.  First, access to and government provision 
of resources decrease the severity of collective action, making non-violent protest more likely.  
Conversely, lack of access to and inadequate government provision of resources increase the 
severity of collective action, making violent protest more likely.  Third, a movement’s use of 
political opportunities provided by socio-economic crises, deprivation, and lack of activists’ 
access to political institutions indicates that the type collective action to be taken initially would 
be non-violent protest.  Fourth, a movement’s lack of use of political opportunities provided by 
socio-economic crises, deprivation, and lack of activists’ access to political institutions indicates 
that the type collective action to be taken initially would be violent protest.  Fifth, the absence of 
widespread government use of repression decreases the severity of collective action, making 
non-violent protest more likely.  Finally, widespread government use of repression increases the 
severity of collective action, making violent protest more likely. 
In conclusion, the examination of Islamic resistance movements identified common 
mobilization characteristics that also confirmed the propositions posited by the American 
paradigm.  First, the cases confirmed that movement activists utilize political opportunities. 





institutions, and organization was confirmed. Third, the cases reified the importance of linkages 
to mobilization.  They, however, could not confirm the proposition that linkages blur the line 
between movements and conventional political parties. The proposition of linkages and the 
blurring of the line producing change in elite receptivity also cannot be confirmed.  Lack of 
confirmation of these propositions may be due to the nature of the cases examined in this study. 
Finally, in the case of Islamic resistance movements, the proposition that the level of structural 
differentiation and political opportunities lead to action outside political boundaries can be 
confirmed but through specification that, a lack of or transitional structural differentiation, 
coupled with the lack of access to autonomous political institutions, leads to action outside 
political boundaries. 
Mobilization from the European Paradigm  
 
The American failed to consider the role identities play in mobilization.  Theorists within 
the European paradigm posited that contemporary movements were mirrors of conflicts found in 
society (Rochon, 1990).  This is because conflict creates new-shared identities based on existing 
social cleavages (Touraine, 1988).  Identities produce collective action or mobilization 
(Vahabzadeh, 2001) to effect relations of social domination (Edelman, 2001).  The process of 
mobilization, according to the European paradigm, is determined by the relation of actors to the 
ends of their action, which provides the possibilities and limits of their action; and, by the 
relationship of actors to their environment, which identifies the field in which action takes place.  
The variables that this paradigm is concerned with include conflict, social cleavages, identity, 
and social domination.  The following table provides the findings across the cases, which is 
followed by a discussion.  
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Table 6.2  Mobilization of Islamic Resistance Movements from the European Paradigm 
Variables Indicators/Questions FIS PIJ Hamas MNLF MILF ASG Percentage 
of Cases 
Was conflict present at 
the time in which each 
movement mobilized?   
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 83% Conflict 
Did conflict exacerbate 
existing cleavages? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 83% 
Were crises present? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Crises 
Did crises exacerbate 
existing cleavages? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
What existing social 
cleavages were present 
when the movements 











Ethno-Religious/ Economic-Class Based/ 
Educational/ Geographical 
  Social 
Cleavages 
What led to the salience 
of those cleavages?   
Crises Conflict/Crises Conflict/Crises Conflict/Crises Conflict/Crises Conflict/Crises 
  
Did each of the 
movements have a 
shared identity?   
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% 
Did their shared identity 
overcome all existing 
social cleavages?  
Yes Yes Yes No No No 50% 
Identity 
If not all, which types 
of cleavages did it 
overcome? 




















Did the movements 
mobilize for effecting 
relations of 
domination? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Social 
Domination 











According to the European paradigm, conflict exacerbates existing cleavages within 
society.  With the exception of Algeria, conflict in part exacerbated existing cleavages within the 
societies where Islamic resistance movements mobilized.  In Algeria, existing cleavages were 
made salient by socio-economic crisis.  Socio-economic crises also exacerbated existing 
cleavages in Palestine and the Philippines.  Economic-class based, educational, ethno-religious 
and geographical cleavages were common in Algerian, Palestinian and Philippine societies.  
Based on these findings, it is posited that conflict or socio-economic crises exacerbated the 
existing cleavages in the societies where Islamic resistance movements mobilized. 
Cleavages are important for mobilization because they create a shared identity among 
movement activists, according to the paradigm.  A shared identity existed among the activists 
that mobilized to form the FIS, the PIJ, Hamas, the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG.  In only the 
cases of the FIS, the PIJ and Hamas were identities shaped by all of the existing societal 
cleavages.  In the other three cases, only some of the existing cleavage formed part of the 
activists’ identity. 
An even more interesting finding was that some of the existing cleavages were not salient 
prior to movement mobilization.  The most significant difference was that of ideology, which 
was only directly related to socio-economic crises and conflict in the Palestinian cases.   Yet, in 
all of the movements, ideology helped to provide a shared identity among activists.  The role of 
ideology was a significant due to the formation of the movements being in part based on the 
rejection of the status quo. 
The European paradigm does not address the role of the status quo, but the American 
paradigm does.  Similarly, the American paradigm does not address the role of identity and 
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ideology in particular.  As these cases demonstrate, ideology is important for creating shared 
identities, which is indirectly affected by conflict and crises.  Movement activists also use it as a 
tool.  In particular, the activists in all of the cases were able to provide a shared identity through 
ideological differentiation from the existing status quo.  This thereby created ideological 
cleavages within society that were not salient prior to mobilization.  Relatedly, all Islamic 
resistance movements activists in this study were able to create a shared identity through 
interaction with one another and society-at-large. 
According to the European paradigm, shared identities produce mobilization to effect 
relations of social domination.  In all of the cases, mobilization of movement activists was to 
affect relations of domination caused by political subordination.  In three of the cases, it was not 
just to effect domination caused by political subordination but also military subordination.  To 
affect relations of domination all the movements mobilized outside conventional political 
boundaries.  The relation of actors to their environment and goals makes action occurring outside 
political boundaries possible, according to the paradigm.  At the time of their mobilizations, the 
PIJ, Hamas, the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG defined themselves as resistance to the existing 
status quo.  These movements also had similar goals, namely the creation of an independent state 
or autonomous region from the existing governing authority and an end to domination.  Hamas 
was different from the other four in the sense that it also included socio-economic development 
of Palestinian society as one of its goals. 
The FIS was also different from the others.  First, the FIS did not define itself as a 
resistance movement.  Rather, it defined itself an opposition party.  The difference in the 
definition of self is related to goals.  The FIS did not reject the Algerian state; it was not calling 
for the overthrow of the governance system or governing party.  Instead, it was calling for 
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freedom of expression and the right to the formation of political parties for participating in the 
existing governance structure.  The FIS’ overarching goals were restoration of Algerian 
sovereignty and, similar to the other movements, an end to political domination. 
In summary, the examination of Islamic resistance movements identified some common 
mobilization characteristics that also confirmed the propositions posited by the European 
paradigm.  First, the proposition that conflict and/or crises exacerbate(s) existing cleavages, 
which provides a shared identity among movement activists was confirmed. Second, it was 
confirmed that mobilization is to effect relations of domination.  Finally, the proposition that the 
relation of these actors to their environment and goals can explain participation outside 
conventional political boundaries was confirmed. 
Conclusion 
  
Movement mobilization is a widely studied phenomenon, but has been largely limited to 
cases arising in the United States, Europe, South Africa and Latin America.  Therefore, this 
study sought to examine the mobilizations of six contemporary Islamic resistance movements, 
namely the Islamic Salvation Front, the Islamic Jihad Movement, the Hamas, the Moro National 
Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf’s Group.  Each 
mobilization was examined through the American and European paradigms. 
From the American paradigm, activists utilizing political opportunities explained the 
mobilization of Islamic resistance movements.  In contrast, the European paradigm explained 
their mobilization through the creation of a shared identity.  The mobilization of Islamic 
resistance movements demonstrated that both the paradigms are correct in their assumptions.  
Mobilization would not have been possible without a shared identity among movement activists.  
The identity of these activists was created in part by the role of socio-economic crises and 
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conflict.  Socio-economic crises caused actual and perceived deprivation among members of the 
societies where the activists resided.  Consequently, the existing societal cleavages were 
exacerbated by crises and conflict.  The salient cleavages were directly and in some instance 
indirectly related to conflict and socio-economic crises.  Socio-economic crises and deprivation 
were also confounded by the level of structural differentiation.  This is because the level of 
structural differentiation determined whether society and thereby activists could access 
government to redress grievances. Islamic resistance activists utilized political opportunities 
provided by the level of structural differentiation and lack of autonomous political institutions to 
aid in their mobilization. In addition to the level of structural differentiation and lack of 
autonomous political institutions to aid in their mobilization, activists also used the government’s 
inadequate provision of resources to create linkages between individuals, institutions and 
organizations. Linkages were necessary for the mobilization of Islamic resistance movements, 
but they did not blur the line between the movements and conventional political or produce 
changes in elite receptivity.  Instead, linkages helped to create a shared identity between 
movement activists and society-at-large.  The creation of a shared identity between activists and 
society was necessary for producing mobilization to affect relations of social domination.  The 
relation of activists to their goals and environment determined the mobilization of Islamic 
resistance movements outside conventional political boundaries.   The environment was defined 
by the lack of, or transitional, structural differentiation and the lack of access to autonomous 
political institutions. 
In conclusion, the Islamic resistance movements herein examined shared common 
mobilization characteristics.  These characteristics were common with those found in other 
studies within the social movement literature on movement mobilizations.  Consequently, 
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general propositions posited by the American and European paradigms were confirmed for the 
most part and were further specified in others to provide greater explanatory power.  Given that 
both paradigms provided explanations for these movements’ mobilizations, an argument can be 
made for the generality of the paradigms.  An argument can also be made for an integrated 
approach.  None of the movements would have been able to mobilize without shared identities 
among their activists and those identities being rooted within existing social cleavages.  
Moreover, their mobilization would not have been possible without the political opportunities 
that were provided by the existence of socio-economic crises, deprivations, and less structural 
differentiation.  This study, therefore, reiterates existing calls for an approach that seeks to 
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